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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates the competitive environment of craft based 
specialist organizations. These are often characterized as entrepreneurial, craft based 
firms that leverage a collective identity of authenticity (and include, but are not restricted 
to: microbreweries and microdistilleries, artisan cheese producers, custom snowboard, 
surfboard and bicycle manufacturers, farm to table restaurants, and organic food 
producers). In this context, I investigate how these entrepreneurial firms leverage 
reputation, identity, and legitimacy to compete with much larger organizations, despite 
their inability to garner competitive advantages based on scope and scale economies. The 
findings are consistent with the notion that craft based organizations operate much 
differently than mainstream markets.
This dissertation is dedicated to my family. 
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
High levels of growth offer organizations a number of competitive benefits 
including access to scarce resources, competitive advantages through scope and scale 
economies, financial leverage, and the ability to build strong network ties through 
partnerships and strategic alliances. However, growth may also signal to the broader 
market (i.e., consumers, competitors, partners, and critics) that an organization has 
fundamentally changed, and that they no longer conform to the characteristics and 
attributes that the organization has come to be known for. As a result, an important 
question for management scholars is, can an organization outgrow their identity? If so, 
what are the consequences and competitive implications when this occurs? This is 
important because it suggests that organizational growth, almost universally perceived as 
a positive, might actually pose significant challenges for a firm’s long-term success and 
survival.
As a result, this dissertation seeks to study the implications of organizational 
growth in a number of different contexts. Of particular interest are industries that are 
home to specialist organizations. Specialist organizations are often characterized as 
entrepreneurial, craft based firms that leverage a collective identity of authenticity (and 
include, but are not restricted to: microbreweries and microdistilleries, artisan cheese
2producers, custom snowboard, surfboard and bicycle manufacturers, farm to table 
restaurants, and organic food producers).
In this context, I investigate how these entrepreneurial firms leverage reputation 
and identity to compete with much larger organizations, despite their inability to garner 
advantages based on scope and scale economies. For example, I build on prior research 
showing how microbrewery startups strategically deploy their collective identity against 
established mass-production breweries. I argue that the ability to leverage a collective 
identity as a strategic resource is bounded in some instances and enhanced in others. 
Specifically, I investigate entrepreneurial growth dynamics by considering the 
implications for microbreweries as they grow, gain notoriety, and potentially violate their 
collective identity. These processes have significant implications for a number of startup 
firms and new industries that leverage a craft based identity, which appear to be gaining 
in number and popularity. In addition, I also study growth dynamics in the in vitro 
fertilization (IVF) industry. Within this context, I study how being ‘stuck in the middle’ 
can drive differential performance and strategies for organizational change and 
innovation in IVF clinics.
In its broadest sense, the goal of my research project is to understand the evolving 
competitive dynamics of specialist organizations. Building on the theoretical 
underpinnings of resource partitioning theory (Carroll, 1985; Carroll et al., 2002) and 
size-localized competition (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), whereby consolidation and 
concentration of generalists at the center of a market open resources on the periphery for 
specialist proliferation, I suggest that new processes are occurring that are reshaping the 
specialist domain. While these theories posit a bifurcation of the market, work in
3organization theory and organizational ecology has focused greater attention on the 
competitive environment at the center of the market (Dobrev et al., 2001; Dobrev et al., 
2002; Reis et al., 2012) relative to the periphery. Indeed, conventional wisdom and the 
extant literature suggest that specialist organizations are simply held at the mercy of 
larger generalists. For example, Hannan (2005) notes that ‘As long as the relevant 
audiences retain the notions underlying the oppositional identity, the specialist niche 
remains safe from invasion from the center of the market.’ Moreover, generalists have 
been shown to create robust identities, which allow them to encroach on specialist 
resources (Swaminathan, 2001). Drawing on the literature related to categories, category 
spanning and category emergence (Zuckerman, 1999; Hsu, 2006; Hsu & Hannan, 2009, 
Negro et al., 2010, Hannan, 2010; Negro & Leung, 2012), I attempt to explicate 
theoretical insights and predictions of how specialist organizations are becoming 
increasingly competitive both in their own competitive space, and in the broader market.
In order to accomplish this, the first study investigates a fundamental paradox in 
craft based specialist organizations. In order to achieve high levels of growth, nascent 
entrepreneurial organizations often seek to leverage a single signature product that has 
proven to be successful in the market. However, for craft based specialists this focused 
strategy often runs counter to a collective social identity built on a sense of authenticity, 
creativity, and unique or even idiosyncratic product development. How, then, do 
specialists reconcile these contrasting logics? Turning to the U.S. craft beer industry, this 
study posits, and finds empirical support for the notion, that as a craft based organization 
becomes known for a signature product (i.e., gains notoriety in the marketplace), the 
appeal of that product will fall. I also find that identity-based cues mitigate this penalty.
4Specifically, product proliferation decreases the penalty for the notoriety of signature 
products. Moreover, the cumulative effects of winning certification contests also serve to 
mitigate this negative relationship. These findings have important implications for our 
understanding of how collective social identities mature and are invoked over time, and 
highlights important boundary conditions with our current theoretical understanding of 
craft based organizations.
The second study continues this logic by investigating specialist organizations at 
the product level. At their core, markets are exchange structures between producers and 
consumers and products are a key element that connects them together. Many new 
markets emerge in direct ideological opposition to incumbent industries. Yet, the ways in 
which ideology affects products in oppositional markets are not well understood. I 
propose that when audiences cannot easily differentiate between products based on 
physical attributes, they rely on ideological discourse about the production process. I 
argue that product names, by embodying linguistically the narrative of this discourse, 
shape the appeal of oppositional products to customers. When products have names that 
are congruent with the collective identity of an oppositional market, they have higher 
appeal to consumers. This beneficial effect is attenuated (1) when audience expectations 
about what type of product should have an oppositional name are violated and (2) when a 
firm develops a strong organizational identity and audiences rely on this identity to make 
inference about the firm’s production process. I find support to this theorizing in the 
longitudinal analyses of products’ appeal in the U.S. craft beer industry, 1996-2012.
These findings suggest that in oppositional markets, when a firm chooses a name for a 
product it should take into consideration not only characteristics of the product and firm
5strategy, but also the collective ideology prevalent in the market discourse.
The third study turns to the context of in vitro fertilization clinics, and seeks to 
understand the interplay between organizational growth and innovation. Specifically, this 
study predicts the occurrence and outcome of peripheral change which existing research 
on core change is not a sufficient explanation. I focus on a special case of peripheral 
change—incremental technology adoption by clinics in the IVF industry, and develop 
arguments that account both for the internal and the external context of organizations 
adopting the technology. I employ organizational size as a measure of the internal context 
and posit that— contrary to intuitions from the literature on core change and radical 
innovation—midsize firms are more likely to implement and to benefit from peripheral 
change than large and small firms. I rely on organizational density as a measure of the 
external context and predict that— again, in contrast to received theory about core 
change—peripheral change is less likely to occur as competition intensifies although the 
benefits of peripheral change are amplified by intensified rivalry. Empirical analysis of 
the growth, failure and technology adoption rates of IVF clinics in the U.S. between 1989 
and 2001 confirm my predictions.
CHAPTER 2
PRODUCT PROLIFERATION IN CRAFT BASED INDUSTRIES
Introduction
When should an organization engage in product proliferation, and what is the 
result of such a strategy? To address this question, management research has widely 
studied the impact that change in product scope, i.e., niche width, has on market appeal 
and firm performance. For example, one perspective suggests that nascent or 
entrepreneurial organizations should employ a focused product portfolio and leverage a 
signature product, which will allow them to develop core competencies and capture scale 
economies, ultimately leading to sustained growth and competitive advantage. Indeed, in 
dynamic market environments organizations must grow quickly and efficiently in order 
to survive. However, the counterfactual often emerges in craft based specialist industries, 
whereby success is derived and measured according to identity-based logics of 
authenticity, creativity, and unique or even idiosyncratic product development. These 
identity-based logics operate in sharp contrast to the mainstream, or mass-production, 
market (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Swaminathan, 2002; Zuckerman & Kim, 2003), 
hindering their ability to exploit these markets, which is home to the majority of a given 
industry’s consumers.
How then do craft based organizations reconcile these pragmatic needs to grow
7their business, with identity-based constraints that penalize organizations for gaining 
notoriety (i.e., brand awareness) and entering, or even thriving in, the mainstream 
market? In an attempt to resolve these diverging perspectives, this study identifies 
organizational identity as a key mechanism influencing a craft based organization’s 
decision to expand its product scope as a means of reinforcing their identity, which can 
be harmed by crossing over into mainstream markets. Building on the notion that ‘the 
very fact that firms differ in scope implies that these organizations vary with respect to 
the underlying codes, or routines, that govern their behavior’ (Sorenson, McEvily, &
Ren, 2006: pg. 916), I identify important boundary conditions in the current 
understanding of how craft based entrepreneurial organizations grow. Indeed, in craft 
based specialist organizations, whose collective identity is centered on a sense of 
authenticity, uniqueness and creativity, product proliferation can serve as an important 
tool to reinforce this identity particularly when growth, commercial success, and 
notoriety threaten to undermine it.
This paper investigates a fundamental paradox in craft based industries. 
Specifically, I test the notion that as craft based specialist organizations grow, gain 
notoriety, and become known for a signature product, the appeal for that product will fall. 
In order to stem this loss in appeal, and the violation of the underlying logic of their 
collective identity, specialist craft based organizations will engage in identity-reinforcing 
behavior seemingly at the expense of this newfound notoriety. In other words, as craft 
based organizations become known for their signature product, they will feel the need to 
undermine this focused brand image by engaging in product proliferation, obfuscating 
this singular identity. Specialists may also turn to external mechanisms to reinforce their
8identity as artisanal and craft based as their product identity becomes more focused. For 
example, specialists who receive awards in certification contests (Rao , 1994), comprised 
of their peers who share this collective identity, are also penalized less for being known 
for a singular or focused product identity. This paper utilizes a unique dataset comprised 
of roughly 1.2 million online beer reviews from 40,000 different beers and 2,000 
breweries over a 17 year time period in the U.S. craft beer industry. However, the results 
have general implications for the evolution of many craft based specialists industries, 
which are surprisingly understudied beyond the early stages of their emergence.
Craft based Organizations and Market Crossover 
Specialist organizations represent a positional subset of a market population, 
which has converged around a given niche in the market, made available on the periphery 
by consolidation and concentration at the center (Carroll, 1985; Dobrev et al., 2001, 
2002). Furthermore, two salient attributes related to the emergence of these 
organizational niches have developed from the extant literature. First, specialist 
organizations exhibit the propensity to cultivate a collective social identity (Carroll & 
Swaminathan, 2000; Swaminathan & Wade, 2002) that is often oppositional in nature, 
reflecting and reinforcing its peripheral position within a given market space. Second, 
from a competitive perspective, specialist organizations have been perceived to occupy a 
tenuous position, effectively being held at the mercy of the broader market. This is due 
to the fact that specialists are thought to proliferate only because the segment of the 
market they occupy did not show enough potential and was not amenable to capturing 
economies of scope and scale that the larger firms sought.
9Indeed, Hannan (2005) notes that these specialists are likely only able to survive 
under specific circumstances: ‘As long as the relevant audiences retain the notions 
underlying the oppositional identity, the specialist niche remains safe from invasion from 
the center of the market’ (pg. 66). This sentiment is echoed in research showing that 
generalist organizations possess the ability to leverage robust identities, encroaching on 
specialist markets as they become more attractive (Swaminathan, 2001). But, in recent 
years craft based organizations appear increasingly capable of crossing over into 
mainstream markets. Indeed, it appears that the challenge facing these organizations is 
not the competitive pressures from the firms operating in mainstream markets, rather 
craft based firms face the challenge of achieving growth without violating their craft 
based identity, and alienating their original customer base.
This paper focuses on a particular set of specialist organizations, specifically 
those that leverage a craft based identity which highlight the organizational attributes of 
authenticity, creativity and uniqueness. These organizations include, but are not limited 
to: microbreweries, artisan cheese producers, microdistilleries, farm to table restaurants, 
luxury boutique hotels, organic food producers, and custom snowboard, surfboard and 
bicycle manufacturers etc. I suggest that these craft based organizations are increasingly 
unique in that their ability to leverage their collective identity as a strategic resource is 
bounded under certain conditions and enhanced under others.
For example, Verhaal et al. (2013) show that oppositional names in the microbrew 
industry have traditionally increased the appeal of beers which utilize them. However, as 
the collective identity of this industry matures, and increasingly enters the mainstream 
market, the use of oppositional names become less effective. Ultimately, the oppositional
10
identity underpinning this specialist industry may be evolving, whereby the salient 
attributes of the broader collective identity is less a function of the oppositional 
relationship with the incumbent industry, and more a function of the internal maturation 
of the specialist industry itself. In suggesting the evolution and change of the specialist 
resource space, I build on the suggestion of previous researchers who have sought to 
connect long-term changes in the environment to microprocesses occurring over time 
within the niche (Dobrev, Kim, & Carroll, 2002)
A Focused Identity for Craft based Organizations 
The role of identity has long been a central theme in organization theory, both at 
the organizational level (Albert & Whetten, 1985) and at the interorganizational or 
collective level (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Swaminathan & Wade, 2002; Glynn, 
2008). At the organizational level, much of this work differentiates identity from an 
organization’s culture or image (Whetten, 2006), as well as details processes of how 
organizations manage multiple identities (Foreman & Whetten, 2002) and consolidate 
identities between organizations (King, Clemens, & Fry, 2010). Moreover, a great deal 
of research has looked at how collective identities emerge (Carroll & Swaminathan,
2000, Kennedy, 2008; Navis & Glynn, 2001). Within this context, two perspectives have 
sought to explain how collective identities become established and gain legitimacy. In 
the first, collective identities become legitimated through a density driven process of 
being counted (Hannan & Freeman, 1989, Kennedy, 2008), whereby proliferation of like- 
minded organizations leads a sense of taken-for-grantedness of the collective identity.
An alternative perspective suggests that collective identities emerge and are legitimated
from the storytelling process of cultural entrepreneurship (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001), 
whereby organizations develop a defining ‘collective identity story’ that highlights the 
group’s core beliefs and practices (Wry, Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2011).
Much less is understood, however, about how these collective identities evolve 
and mature over time. Once legitimated, collective identities benefit organizations in a 
myriad of ways and provide security against broader competitive forces in the market. 
However, as organizations, and the environment that they operate in, change and evolve 
do collective identities evolve as well? Ostensibly, organizations remain a member 
within a collective identity as long as the routines and logics that an organization adheres 
to fits with the broader collective. In the event that an actor’s individual identity no 
longer fits, they may either be pushed out or seek to transfer to a new collective that 
better aligns with the actor’s identity logic (Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003). For example, 
Wry et al. (2011: pg. 449-450) suggest that as actors within a collective identity 
proliferate, ‘collective identity members face pressure to differentiate themselves within 
the group to be competitively distinctive and secure needed resources.’ I suggest, 
however, that for craft based specialist organizations a much different process is 
occurring. I argue that specialist craft based industries do not distinguish themselves to 
secure needed resources. Indeed, organizations that are capable of securing these 
resources are increasingly at risk of violating the underlying logic of their collective craft 
based identity.
This identity violation leads consumers and other audience members to reevaluate 
their perceptions of these organizations and should result in a penalty for these 
organizations. This contrasts with the notion that specialists should project a focused
11
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product identity (Zuckerman et al., 2003). It also creates a competitive disadvantage for 
these firms, because particularly for nascent and entrepreneurial organizations, success is 
often driven by the ability to garner recognition for a signature product that fuels rapid 
growth. This rapid growth is most effectively and efficiently achieved from leveraging a 
focused brand, both in terms of marketing and production. Indeed, focusing on primarily 
one product allows specialist organizations to streamline production, and begin to reap 
the benefits of scale economies. Moreover, leveraging a focused product portfolio allows 
nascent organizations to avoid the early stage pitfalls of expansion beyond their 
capabilities. For example, Zahavi and Lavie (2013) show that during the early stages of 
intra-industry diversification, specialist organizations can be hurt by a process of negative 
transfer, or an inability to adjust to extraneous factors or context when adding additional 
products that appear to be similar to existing products. In contrast, once the success of a 
signature product is well-established, this gives these entrepreneurs the flexibility and 
resources to expand their product scope and survive these early problems, potentially 
leading to a halo-effect for these new products which are benefiting from the brand equity 
that the signature product has created.
However, in craft based specialist organizations as an individual product becomes 
popular, and the identity of the organization as a whole becomes associated increasingly 
with that product, consumers may perceive these firms to be increasingly mainstream, or 
lacking in authenticity. Importantly, these firms may not have actually crossed over into 
the mainstream market, however, their notoriety creates the perception of market 
crossover. Part of the appeal of these craft based products is the notion of authenticity 
and exclusivity. Therefore, as these organizations build up economies of scale and
13
expand the distribution and reach of their signature product, the exclusivity of the product 
wanes. It also becomes much more difficult for these organizations to convince 
consumers that their product was produced using traditional craft based methods. This 
leads to the following hypothesis related to product focus and consumer appeal:
• H1: The more a craft based organization becomes known for a signature 
product, the lower the appeal for that product.
Internal Context -  Product Scope 
How then do these organizations reinforce this identity logic, when faced with the 
paradoxical challenge of being hurt by growth and notoriety? This paper suggests that 
craft based organizations, which are harmed by gaining notoriety for a signature product, 
can engage in identity reinforcing behavior via product proliferation or an increase in 
their product scope. Diversification, via intra-industry product proliferation, has long 
been thought to benefit organizations, so at first glance this may not come as a surprise. 
The primary driver of this benefit is suggested to be the ability to create scope economies. 
Scope economies have been shown to benefit organizations in two fundamental ways: 
first, it creates synergies and opportunities for resource sharing across product and 
business lines (Sorenson, 2000; Stern & Henderson, 2004; Tanriverdi & Lee, 2008); 
second, scope economies foster multimarket contact (Gimenco & Woo, 1999) and a 
general reduction in the competitive pressures within an industry.
However, the impact that product scope has on the ability of organizations to 
manage a collective identity is less understood. Particularly for specialist organizations, 
the implications for product proliferation are a particularly thorny issue. For example, 
as understood within the theoretical underpinnings of resource partitioning theory
14
(Carroll, 1985; Carroll, Dobrev, & Swaminathan, 2002), specialist organizations ought to 
maintain a focused or narrow niche width lest they open themselves to competition from 
the center of the market. Moreover, research on the identity-based constraints posed by 
market categories suggests that specialist organizations face market-based penalties if 
they span multiple market categories (Hsu, 2006; Negro et al., 2010; Negro & Leung, 
2013) or cannot be easily placed or identified within a specific classification set 
(Zuckerman, 1999). The logic underlying this assertion is that a focused product 
portfolio signals a coherent identity to audience members, while a diffuse product 
identity creates confusion as to the organization’s purpose (Zuckerman, 2000; Zuckerman 
et al., 2003).
I suggest that craft based specialists represent a unique set of specialist 
organizations in that they are able to span market categories or classification sets 
precisely because their collective identity is built on the notions of creativity, authenticity 
and a sense of artistic expression and playfulness. Therefore, rather than causing 
confusion, a broad product scope serves to reinforce the underlying tenets of a collective 
identity. This in turn should allow craft based specialist organizations to take advantage 
of the notoriety that accompanies a signature or hallmark product. This results in the 
following hypothesis related to product scope, diffuse identities, and a appeal for 
signature products:
• H2a: The greater the product scope for craft based specialist organizations, the 
greater the appeal for its signature product.
With the notion established that product scope has a positive impact on the appeal 
of a craft based specialist products, I attempt to reconcile this finding with the previous 
assertion that the greater the notoriety of a specialist’s signature product, the lower its
appeal. As noted above, I argue that within craft based organizations, the goal of 
diversification and product proliferation is neither to create scope or scale economies, nor 
is it to competitively differentiate oneself from likeminded specialists in order to gain 
access to scarce resources (Wry et al., 2011). Quite the contrary, I suggest that product 
proliferation may be a function of two distinct, yet related processes. The first is that 
product proliferation within craft based organizations occurs as a natural expression of 
one’s underlying codes and routines (Sorenson et al., 2006), which as opposed to 
competitively differentiating these specialists, actually serves to conform to other 
likeminded organizations operating under the same protective cloak of the given 
industry’s collective identity.
Second, by invoking this collective identity though product proliferation, craft 
based specialist organizations may be attempting to counter the paradox described above 
whereby growth, notoriety, and product awareness leads to identity violation and the 
reduced appeal of an organization’s signature product. Under these conditions, craft 
based organizations may seek to engage in product proliferation as a means of internal 
identity reinforcement in order to realign the logics and routines of the organization with 
the broader identity of the specialist craft based collective.
• H2b: The greater the product scope for craft based organizations, the lower the 
appeal penalty for becoming known for a signature product.
External Context -  Certification Contests 
An organization’s ability to gain public recognition and approval has been shown 
to result in a myriad of positive externalities for the organization. The cumulative effect 
of this recognition, or legitimacy, has often been suggested in the literature to represent
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the social construct of reputation. Organizational reputation can be understood as ‘an 
intangible asset based on broad public recognition of the high quality of its capabilities 
and outputs (Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova, 2010). Furthermore, one means of measuring 
the construct of reputation is through certification contests (Rao, 1994; Wade et al., 2006; 
Graffin & Ward, 2010). At their core, certification contests represent ‘social tests’ of 
organizations and their products (Thompson, 1967; Rao, 1994) which situate 
organizations within a hierarchy of their peers.
The reputation of an organization is important to those actors that are members of 
a collective social identity. This is due to the fact that reputation sends signals to the 
market about an organization’s general ability, and potentially reduces uncertainty related 
to the degree to which an actor adheres to the logic of that collective identity. 
Furthermore, reputation is particularly important for craft based specialist organizations, 
because the identity of these actors is premised precisely on the notions of quality and 
authenticity. While organizations possess internal mechanisms through the ability to 
adopt symbols that project a sense of cognitive legitimacy (Scott, 1987), craft based 
specialists can also benefit from external signals that portray them as appropriate or 
reputable firms. Absent this endorsement from the general public, specialist 
organizations would likely be forced to compete with actors in the mainstream market, 
without the protective cover of a collective social identity. Those actors that are able to 
gain this public endorsement and the recognition of their peers should, ceteris paribus, 
enjoy greater appeal for their products, including their signature products. This leads to 
the following hypothesis related to reputation, certification contests and product appeal:
• H3a: The greater the reputation o f a craft based organization, the greater the 
appeal for its signature product.
17
However, can the accumulation of reputation over time compensate for the 
violation of a craft based specialist’s collective identity? As noted above, craft based 
specialists who achieve notoriety, and are perceived as mainstream, run the risk of 
violating their collective identity of creativity, uniqueness and authenticity. While this 
study highlights an internal mechanism for mitigating this penalty, I argue that external 
signal of reputation, conferred through cumulative awards garnered in certification 
contests, can also mitigate this penalty for violating a craft based collective identity. 
Importantly, these awards or signals of reputation must originate from peers or authority 
figures within the bounds of the collective social identity. Indeed, garnering a reputation 
beyond the confines of this collective may actually produce the opposite effect, creating 
notoriety and a lack of authenticity. This type of notoriety may actually be more akin to 
celebrity (Rindova, et al., 2006), as opposed to reputation, and this study seeks to 
differentiate along those lines precisely because in craft based specialists industries 
notoriety or celebrity should run counter to the underlying foundations of the collective 
identity.
Assuming, then, that signals of reputation are consistent with the underlying 
tenets of the craft based specialist’s collective social identity, I argue that this cumulative 
reputation effect has the ability to mitigate the penalty incurred by actors that gain 
notoriety which is fueled by growth derived from the success of a signature product.
• H3b: The greater the reputation for craft based organizations, the lower the 
appeal penalty for becoming known for a signature product.
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Empirical Setting
According the Brewer’s Association (BA)1, an American craft brewer should be 
small, independent and traditional. This means that a beer producer is classified as a craft 
brewer if it produces less than 6 million barrels of beer per year, is less than 25% owned 
by another alcoholic beverage company, and adheres to the recognized industry standards 
for quality and tradition. The craft brewing industry consists of two market segments: 
microbreweries and brewpubs that produce less than 15,000 barrels of beer per year and 
regional breweries that produce between 15,000 and 6 million barrels per year.
Breweries that produce more than 6 million barrels per year are considered to be mass 
production breweries, and cannot be called a craft brewery2.
The craft brewing market emerged in the 1980s and saw tremendous growth in 
the ensuing years. This phenomenon is well documented in previous research (e.g., 
Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000). Furthermore, it represents a clear example of resource 
partitioning whereby market consolidation of mass producers created a resource space on 
the periphery for the proliferation of microbreweries and brewpubs (Carroll, 1985;
Carroll, Dobrev & Swaminathan, 2002). Another reason for the rise of the craft brewers 
was the homogenization of beer from mass producers that created a space for product
1 The Brewer’s Association is considered throughout the brewing industry as the 
authority on craft brewing and microbrews in the United States. In its role as an advocate 
for craft breweries it serves a number of functions, for example, a lobbyist, publisher and 
organizer of the two largest beer festivals in the world (the Great American Beer Festival 
and the World Beer Cup).
2 This threshold was recently changed by the Brewer’s Association, and had previously 
been 2 million barrels per year. However, as large regional breweries, such as Boston 
Beer Company (i.e., Sam Adams), began to reach this production limit, the limit was 
increased to include them. At the same time, lawmakers from Massachusetts also 
successfully lobbied Congress to extend current tax breaks for craft breweries to include 
production up to 6 million barrels per year.
differentiation based on technical product dimensions, such as taste and ingredients.
The emergence of microbreweries and brewpubs gave rise to a social movement 
that promoted the idea of imperative for tradition and authenticity in beer brewing. The 
organizational form identity based on tradition and authenticity has largely prevented the 
large, mass producers from encroaching on the specialist resource space and winning 
over microbrew consumers. This happened even though over time mass breweries 
learned to remove the technical impediments (e.g., taste, color, etc.) that at first 
objectively disadvantaged their products relative to craft beers. It is now seen as an 
identity constraint -  craft beer audiences see mass producers as only making low-quality 
beer and focusing more on profits than on beer (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000). The 
perceived low reputation of mass producers is so strong that in some cases it even 
spillovers to craft breweries. For example, because American lager is strongly 
associated with mass producers, when microbreweries make this style of beer by 
authentic methods beer enthusiasts still perceive it as low quality and inauthentic (Barlow 
& Verhaal, 2013).
Craft brewers offer a range of different beers within a broad range of categories. 
Indeed, it is not uncommon for even small microbreweries to offer multiple styles of beer 
that all require different ingredients and brewing techniques. For example, Epic Brewing 
Company located in Salt Lake City, Utah is a relatively small microbrewery that has been 
in business since 2010. In that time they have produced over 40 different beers that span 
the entire range of beer styles. They include: stouts, American lagers, barleywine, 
pumpkin ale, Belgian ales, fruit beers, and even organic and gluten-free styles. This 
sense of diversity, originality and playfulness in the brewing process is a hallmark of the
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craft beer movement’s social identity.
Data Sources
In order to test how product proliferation of craft beers and signature beer 
notoriety impact product appeal to consumers, I use consumers’ online ratings of beer. 
Consumers provide ratings to declare the value they attach to a firm’s product (Zeithaml, 
1988; Kovacs, Carroll & Lehman, 2013). Such value ratings are one manifestation of 
product appeal (Kovacs & Hannan, 2011). They tend to shape consumer product choices 
(Sweeney & Soutar, 2001) and consequently affect organizational performance (Luca, 
2011). With the continued proliferation of the Internet as a means of communication and 
interaction, consumer value ratings have been increasingly declared in public forums 
through online reviews posted on review websites. These websites have recently become 
a popular data source for studies on product and organizational appeal (e.g., Kovacs, 
Carroll & Lehman, 2013; Kovacs & Hannan, 2011; Luca, 2011).
The reviews for this study come from the online beer review website 
BeerAdvocate (www.beeradvocate.com). BeerAdvocate has been in existence since 1996 
and has data on ratings of 83,000 different beers from all over the world. As of January, 
2013, it has totaled 2.7 million reviews. These reviews were written by 25,974 unique 
users, for which the average number of reviews was 45.6 with a maximum number of 
reviews of 3,960. In 2013, BeerAdvocate received on average 25 million page views 
from 2.5 million unique visitors per month.
On BeerAdvocate, any user can create an account and then rate and write a review 
about a beer listed in the database. Reviewers can rate beers across four specific
dimensions: look, smell, taste, and feel on a 1-to-5 scale (they can also provide an 
‘overall’ score), as well as write additional commentary and critique about each 
dimension. Once a user gains a certain amount of reviewing experience and legitimacy 
on the website, s/he can suggest a new beer for review that has not been incorporated into 
the online database yet. The website uses a developed classification framework and 
places newly suggested beers into appropriate style categories before making them 
available for reviewing.
BeerAdvocate is an appropriate data source for testing my hypotheses for several 
reasons. First, the website is broadly recognized by mass media (e.g., the New York 
Times, USA Today, Boston Globe) and by Alexa Internet Inc. (a leading company that 
tracks web traffic data) as one of the two largest online beer review sites and online beer 
communities in the world. The other largest online website, RateBeer, was founded in 
2000. Second, BeerAdvocate provides detailed information about reviews, reviewers, 
beers, and breweries, such as, for example, beer style, beer review score, date of beer 
review and so on. It covers a great variety of beers, including very rare ones. Finally, 
BeerAdvocate is popular among craft beer enthusiasts and beer lovers and, thus, allows 
us to look at the effect of signature beer notoriety on the audience for which these 
products are intended.
For the purposes of this study, the data are restricted to the U.S. craft breweries 
only (i.e., production less that 6 million barrels per year), and represents the entire 
population of reviews of these organizations and their beers from the website’s inception 
in 1996 through May of 2012. The final dataset consists of 1,151,627 unique reviews of 
41,982 different beers produced by 1,954 unique craft breweries. The data are
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aggregated at the brewery-year level, and the final dataset consists of 11,145 brewery- 
year observations (see Figure 2.1).
Operationalization of Variables
Dependent variable. The dependent variable in this study, signature beer appeal, 
isolates the single beer for a given brewery that has received the greatest number of 
reviews in a given year (i.e. its signature beer). I then calculate the average rating of all 
beer reviews for this beer in a given year. Each individual review scores a beer on a scale 
of 1-5 (in increments of 0.25) based on five dimensions: look, smell, taste, feel and 
overall. The total mean of these five component scores is taken for each review and then 
averaged by year to calculate the yearly average signature beer score, resulting in the 
signature beer’s audience appeal. The resulting measure is a continuous variable ranging 
from 1 to 5.
Independent variables. In order to test the main effect of a signature beer’s level 
of notoriety on its appeal, I construct the variable, signature beer notoriety (H1), which is 
a ratio of the total number or reviews that a brewery receives for its signature beer 
relative to its total number of reviews for all beers. In other words, this variable captures 
the degree to which its signature beer is known, discussed and reviewed relative to its 
other beers. For example, if  Brewery ‘X ’ receives 100 total reviews in 2008, and 75 of 
those are reviews of it signature beer, the resulting value is 0.75.
The main effect of product scope is calculated as a count of the total number of 
beers that a brewery has received at least one review for in a given year. While not a 
perfect proxy for a brewery’s product portfolio, because beer is a perishable good, it is
likely that if  a beer was reviewed in a given year it was likely produced not too long 
before the review was conducted. Furthermore, because of the emphasis of quality in the 
brewing process, it is unlikely that craft breweries will systematically sell beers that are 
more than one year old. In order to test Hypothesis 2b, I interact the product scope 
variable with the notoriety of the signature beer (scope*notoriety).
The main effect of reputation is calculated as the cumulative count of the total 
number of medals that a given brewery has won at the Great American Beer Festival.
This festival, run by the Brewer’s Association, represents the most popular and well 
known certification contest in the craft brewing industry. During the festival, beers are 
judged by style using a blind review process and winners are awarded either a gold, 
silver, or bronze medal. In order to test Hypothesis 3b, I interact the reputation variable 
with the notoriety of a brewery’s signature beer (reputation*notoriety).
Control variables. Unfortunately, data for both production and founding/failure 
date are complete for only about 75% of breweries in the dataset. In order to provide a 
next best approximation for these variables I calculate a dummy variable for size, which 
represents a 1 if a given brewery was one of the Top 50 producers in the industry in a 
given year. This list of top 50 craft beer producers is calculated and published each year 
by the Brewers Association, which is widely considered to be the leading authority on the 
craft beer industry in the United States. Additionally, to account for organizational age, I 
calculate a tenure variable which counts the total number of years that a given brewery 
has appeared in the dataset (i.e., the total number of years that a brewery has received at 
least one review).
In order to rule out additional alternative explanations to the proposed hypotheses,
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I control for a number of different variables at various levels of analysis. The 
competitive environment of the industry could potentially play a role in the appeal of an 
organization’s product, including its signature product. Therefore, I control for year 
brewery density. Next, I account for the overall popularity of the industry as a whole by 
calculating the natural log of the total number of industry reviews by year. The degree to 
which a brewery is generally known may also influence the appeal of its signature 
product, so I control for the total number of yearly reviews that a brewery receives. Next, 
prior research (Barlow & Verhaal, 2013) has shown that in the craft beer industry beers in 
the American lager category are particularly devalued, therefore I control for the total 
number of Ameican lager reviews a given brewery receives as this may influence overall 
levels of appeal and/or reputation of the brewery. I also control for the total number of 
unique reviewers that a brewery receives in a given year. If a particular brewery is 
reviewed by only a small number of reviewers, this may artificially inflate or deflate the 
appeal of their beers. Importantly, the model accounts for state fixed effects by including 
state dummies (however, due to size constraints these dummies are not included in the 
final tables). This is important because the craft beer industry has traditionally been a 
very regional industry, where certain areas of the country have much higher levels of 
participation. As a result, the location of a given brewery may impact its appeal. I also 
control for year fixed effects.
Specification. The empirical model regresses the dependent variable, signature 
beer appeal, in a given year on the main effect predictor variables, interactions, and other 
observables in the previous year. This eliminates all brewery-year records in the last 
observation year for each of the breweries in the data. It also completely eliminates
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breweries with single-year observations. As a result, from the original 11,145 
observations we are left with a final sample with 8,726 brewery-year observations from 
1,646 different breweries.
I use population-average techniques to model all hypotheses, specifically the 
method of generalized estimating equations (GEE) which allows me to model variance 
both between breweries and across time for each brewery. GEE was first introduced by 
Liang and Zeger (1986), and Zeger, Liang, and Albert (1988). The data are structured as 
an unbalanced panel with multiple observations of different length for each brewery. The 
different brewery-year records for each brewery are likely autocorrelated because of 
permanent but unobserved brewery characteristics. To control for such serial correlation 
between the records for each brewery, I use the exchangeable correlation matrix and 
calculated cluster-robust standard errors based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator 
(Huber, 1967; White, 1980), as implemented in Stata 12.
Results
Descriptive statistics for control variables and key explanatory variables are 
presented in Table 2.1.
Table 2.2 tests for the main effect of the notoriety of a brewery’s signature beer. 
Model 3.1 in Table 2.2 is a baseline model. Controls show common effects in the 
expected direction. The more intense the competitive environment, the more difficult it 
is for a brewery’s signature beer to gain widespread appeal as there are many alternatives 
to compare it to. As a result, appeal is lower during periods of higher brewery density. 
The greater number of overall reviews that a brewery receives, the higher the appeal of its
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signature beer. This might suggest that becoming more well know is a positive for 
breweries. However, further analysis reveals that this effect is non-monotonic and the 
squared term of cumulative brewery reviews is negative and significant. In this light, the 
positive linear effect makes sense because even unique breweries must first gain some 
level of attention and praise before they can be considered mainstream. The number of 
American lager reviews that a brewery receives also appears to represent a negative halo 
effect, as an increase in these reviews is associated with lower appeal for a signature beer. 
Finally, the longer a brewery stays on the market, the lower its appeal for a signature 
beer. This is consistent with the general argument that craft based specialists who are 
perceived to be mainstream are penalized because it does not fit with the collective 
identity of authenticity and uniqueness.
Model 3.2 tests the main effect of a signature beer’s notoriety on its appeal. The 
effect is strongly negative and significant. Therefore, as a brewery’s signature beer 
becomes more well-known relative to its overall product portfolio, the appeal for this 
product declines. Hypothesis 1 is fully supported.
Model 4.1 in Table 2.3 tests the impact of product proliferation on appeal. The 
coefficient is positive and significant which suggests that the greater the product scope of 
a brewery, the higher the appeal of its signature beer. I argue that this is due to the fact 
that craft based specialist organizations which produce many different types of products 
are rewarded because they are conforming to their craft based collective identity. 
Hypothesis 2a is confirmed. However, despite a broad product scope, many 
organizations become known for a signature or hallmark product. This is problematic for 
craft based specialists who are penalized for appearing mainstream. Still, can increasing
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product scope potentially alleviate some of the negative perceptions for entering the 
mainstream? Model 4.2 tests the interaction of product scope and the notoriety (Figure 
2.2) of a brewery’s signature beer (i.e., the degree to which it is known on the market). 
The interaction is positive and significant suggesting that product proliferation can serve 
as a mechanism or tool to reduce the penalty that breweries face for being perceived as 
more mainstream. In other words, holding a signature beer’s notoriety constant, 
increases in product scope will be associated with an increase in a signature beer’s 
appeal. Hypothesis 2b is confirmed.
Turning to the external context, I suggest that higher levels of reputation, 
conferred by external stakeholders who are still members of an actor’s collective identity, 
will lead to higher levels of appeal for a brewery’s signature beer. Model 4.2 tests this 
using the cumulative number of medals that a brewery has won at the Great American 
Beer Festival. The coefficient is positive and significant, suggesting that in addition to 
internal tools (i.e., product scope), there are also external mechanisms such as reputation 
which serve to increase the appeal of a brewery’s appeal for its signature beer.
Hypothesis 3a is fully supported. However, can this increased reputation also help 
alleviate the penalty associated with craft based specialists being considered mainstream? 
In Model 4.4, the interaction of reputation and the notoriety of a brewery’s signature beer 
is also positive and significant (Figure 2.3). This suggests that actors within a craft based 
collective identity are willing to overlook to some extent an actor entering the 
mainstream if they are deemed to possess a high reputation. Hypothesis 3b is fully 
supported. Finally, Model 4.5 represents a fully specified model and the both interaction 
effects still hold and are highly significant.
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Robustness Checks
In order to confirm the robustness of these findings and rule out further alternative 
explanations, I test the results in multiple ways. At very low levels of signature beer 
notoriety, it may be difficult for consumers and the broader market to identify exactly 
which beer is a brewery’s signature beer. For example, a value of .05 for this variable 
implies that only 5% of a brewery’s overall reviews are for its most reviewed beer, 
suggesting a brewery may have many well know beers rather than one clear signature 
beer. In order to account for this possibly biasing the results, I excluded all observations 
where the value of signature beer notoriety was less than 0.10 (or 10% of all brewery 
reviews). After running all models again, all results held as they had previously. This 
suggests that the measure is indeed capturing the perception of notoriety for a brewery’s 
signature beer. Additionally, at very high levels of signature beer notoriety, this variable 
may not sufficiently be capturing notoriety per se, but rather a brand new brewery that is 
just beginning to receive reviews. In order to account for these breweries potentially 
biasing the results, I excluded all observations where signature beer notoriety was greater 
than 0.90, and reran all models. All hypothesized results held excluding these levels of 
notoriety as well.
In addition, breweries that are relatively new on the market, or not very popular, 
may not have developed enough notoriety to legitimately have a signature beer. While 
possible, it is less likely that breweries have achieved notoriety, or are perceived to have 
a true signature beer, if  the brewery has not garnered a significant number of reviews on 
the Beer Advocate website. In order to account for this, I excluded all observations for 
breweries that had received fewer than 50 cumulative total reviews on the website, and
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rerun all models. The results were largely unchanged and robust to this specification (the 
main effect for medals won became marginally significant). All other models remain 
unchanged and fully significant. To take this assumption a step further, I reran all models 
excluding observations for breweries that had received less than 100 reviews on the 
website. Results remain robust and unchanged to the specification with 50 cumulative 
reviews.
In order to account for the possibility that certain breweries are inherently 
different, and therefore driving the effect of reduced appeal for signature beer notoriety, I 
run models that control for specific ‘types’ of breweries. For example, within the craft 
beer industry, breweries often operate as brewpubs rather than strictly as a brewery. In 
essence these organizations are combining brewing with operating a restaurant, and 
therefore their perception by consumers may be different from firms that are strictly 
breweries. Additionally, some breweries contract out the production of some or all of 
their beers to other breweries. This is often done when breweries do not have the 
production capacity to meet demand. Prior research has shown that there is a negative 
perception of these contract breweries in the market (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000), 
because they violate the underlying identity codes of the collective identity. As a result, I 
rerun all models controlling for these different types of firms utilizing dummy variables 
for breweries that are either brewpubs or contract some or all of their production to other 
organizations. Results are unchanged and robust to these alternative specifications.
These variables are not included in the original models because I do not have complete 
data for all breweries, and models were run on a subset of the data. The dummies for 
brewpub and contract breweries are complete for 1,586 of the 1,954 breweries in the
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dataset, or just over 80% of all breweries.
Another factor that could impact both brewery appeal and the appeal of their 
products is the size of the brewery. Large breweries run the risk of violating a collective 
identity built on authenticity and small production within the microbrew industry, which 
could lead to perceptions or associations with mass-production brewing. While in the 
original models I control for the largest craft breweries by including a dummy variable 
for the largest 50 craft breweries in the industry in a given year, I ran further analyses to 
account for this size effect. In order to do this I include a variable that was a count of the 
number of barrels of beer that a brewery produced in the year that it entered the dataset. 
Breweries which are already large once they enter the dataset may be perceived 
differently than breweries that enter when they are small and simply grow as a result of 
increasing popularity. Results are robust to the inclusion of this variable. However, like 
the brewpub and contract controls, data are incomplete for all breweries. Therefore this 
model was run using a subset of 1,177 breweries.
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study identifies a fundamental paradox in craft based specialist 
organizations, which has important implications for a number of different theoretical 
areas of management and organization theory. While nascent and entrepreneurial 
organizations should ostensibly benefit from the emergence and success of a signature 
product, specialist craft based organizations face market penalties when they grow or 
gained notoriety because this runs counter to their collective social identity which is built 
on a sense of authenticity, creativity, and uniqueness. In order to reconcile these two
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perspectives, I suggest that craft based specialists are unique in that, because their 
identity is founded on this sense of authenticity, leveraging a diffuse product identity may 
help mitigate the market penalty for gaining notoriety and becoming mainstream.
Specifically, I find that as craft breweries become well known for a signature 
product, the appeal for that product falls. This places these organizations in a very 
difficult strategic position, because particularly for nascent entrepreneurs, growth and 
survival is often driven by the ability to create and sustain these types of products. 
However, I also find that these craft based specialists can mitigate the damage that this 
notoriety creates by expanding their product scope. While traditionally specialists are 
thought to benefit from a focused, not a diffuse, identity, I argue that craft based 
specialists are unique in that they are able to diversify their product portfolio because 
their collective identity specifically values the notions of creativity, uniqueness and 
authenticity. As a result, microbreweries are more easily able to leverage a signature 
product, without the risks associated with being perceived as too mainstream.
I also find that breweries’ reputations, as conferred by stakeholders that also share 
their collective identity, mitigates this notoriety penalty. In essence, evaluators appear to 
be overlooking the fact that breweries are becoming mainstream, because the reputation 
of a brewery signals that despite this notoriety they are still engaging in high quality and 
authentic production practices.
These findings deepen our understanding of specialist craft based organizations. 
While this study focuses on the U.S. craft brewing industry, the implications are 
generalizable to a number of other industries. These types of craft based industries 
appear to be gaining in number and popularity and represent a unique context through
which to apply extant theoretical perspectives as well as build new theoretical insights. 
Moreover, while the craft beer industry has been ubiquitously cited in the management 
literature as the prototype for a specialist organization, as well as a social movement 
operating under a collective identity, there are relatively few studies that use it as an 
empirical setting to test specific hypotheses (for example, relative to the automobile, 
biotechnology, technology/computer/silicon valley/, banking, and pharmaceutical 
industries etc.). The reality is that we know relatively little about the nuances of the 
industry beyond it serving as the classic example of a specialist industry, vis-a-vis 
generalists as understood within the construct of resource partitioning theory.
More broadly speaking, the results suggest that these specialist industries may be 
evolving, and that our theoretical understanding of the constraints that these organizations 
operate under should also evolve as well. Thus, I build on the theoretical insights 
outlined within the context of resource-partitioning theory, but I also identify important 
boundary conditions for how specialists are in some instances constrained, and in others 
emboldened by their specialist identity. This paper also contributes to the literature 
related to collective social identities by providing insight on how these identities evolve 
and change beyond their emergence and formative years. Additional research in this area 
may seek to distinguish between what happens to collective identities as they decline 
over time relative to how they may change and evolve, by incorporating new members or 
changing the core logics of the identity itself. Finally, the paper contributes to the 
literature related to product scope and product proliferation, which has implications not 
only for craft based specialists but a wide range of entrepreneurial organizations.
Overall, this paper seeks to highlight the strategic paradox that craft based
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specialist organizations face when growth and success lead directly to the violation of 
one’s collective identity. The implications of this are clear: should these actors simply be 
content to maintain a stable size and growth trajectory? Or are there mechanisms at their 
disposal which will allow them to reconcile these countervailing forces? These questions 
seem particularly relevant and we see the increased popularity of these types of 




Descriptive Statistics for Signature Beers
Variables mean sd min max
Brewery Density/100 (t) 10.96028 3.5838 0.01 15.83
Industry Reviews In (t) 11.40365 1.114336 0 12.44525
Cumulati ve Brewery Reviews/1,001 0.4269 1.779196 0.001 40.36
American Lager Reviews/10 (t) 0.2753 1.564124 0 40.3
Reviewer Count/100 (t) 1.7513 1.84337 0.01 16.02
Top 50 Producti on = 1 (t) 0.0579516 0.233664 0 1
Brewery Tenure (t) 4.887752 3.212566 1 17
Signature Beer Notoriety (t) 0.4111759 0.2854162 0.0201613 1
Product Scope (t) 10.89394 14.03492 1 276
Reputati on (t) 1.151279 4.212765 0 85
Number of Breweries = 1,930; Number of brewery-year observati ons = 11,145
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Table 2.2





Brewery Density/100 (t) -0.019*** -0.018***
(0.004) (0.004)
Industry Reviews In (t) 0.023* 0.015
(0.011) (0.011)
Cumulati ve Brewery Reviews/1,000 (t) 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.005) (0.005)
American Lager Reviews/10 (t) -0.010** -0.010**
(0.003) (0.003)
Reviewer Count/100 (t) 0.002 - 0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Top 50 Product! on = l( t ) -0.017 -0.031
(0.034) (0.034)
Time Since First Review (t) -0.008* -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003)




State Dummies Yes Yes
Wald Chi-Squared 223.81 257.98
Scale Parameter 0.2758837 0.2689239
df 57 58
Dependent variable is yearly signature beer appeal and is led by 1-year 
N = 8,726
+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 two tailed test
Unstandardized coeff ecients reported
Robust standard errors clustered by brewery in parentheses
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Table 2.3











Brewery Density/100 (t) -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.016***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Industry Reviews In (t) 0.012 0.008 0.012 0.016 0.013
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Cumuiati ve Brewery Reviews/1,000 (t) 0.011* 0.012** 0.011* 0.012** 0.012**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
American Lager Reviews/10 (t) -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Reviewer Count/100 (t) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Top 50 Producti on = 1 (t) -0.042 -0.044 -0.048 -0.054 -0.056
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
Time Since First Review (t) -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.017***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Signature Beer Notoriety (t) -0.129*** -0.162*** -0.133*** -0.148*** -0.174***
(0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032)
Product Scope (t) 0.003*** 0.002* 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Scope*Notoriety (t) 0.015*** 0.012**
(0.004) (0.004)
Reputati on (t) 0.005* -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Reputati on*Notoriety (t) 0.032*** 0.027***
(0.009) (0.008)
Constant 4.215*** 4.247*** 4.197*** 4.150*** 4.183***
(0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127) (0.127)
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Chi-Squared 280.85 307.06 279.5 308.88 326.94
Scale Parameter 0.266399 0.2649888 0.2656279 0.2636447 0.2627746
df 59 60 60 61 62
Dependent variable is yearly signature beer appeal and is led  by 1-year 
N = 8,726
+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001two tailed test
Unstandardized coeff ecients reported
Robust standard errors clustered by brewery in parentheses
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Year
High Signature Beer Notoriety Meduim Signature Beer Notoriety
Low Signature Beer Notoriety *  Average Number of Beers per Brewery
Figure 2.1: Number of Breweries By Year
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Signature Beer Notoriety (percentage of overall reviews 
that signature beer reviews represent)
Product Scope = 5 - “  Product Scope = 25 
Product Scope = 45 - “  Product Scope = 65
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Signature Beer Notoriety (percentage of overall reviews that 
signature beer reviews represent)
Medals Won = 0 Medals Won = 5 Medals Won = 10 Medals Won = 15
Figure 2.3: Reputation and Signature Beer Notoriety Interactions
CHAPTER 3
OPPOSITIONAL PRODUCT NAMES3 
Introduction
The questions of why new industries emerge and how they manage to persist and 
develop have long interested researchers. Scholars have studied how new markets come 
into existence as a result of new technological inventions (Tushman & Anderson, 1986; 
Klepper, 1996; Benner & Tripsas, 2012), recombination of existing technologies 
(Levinthal, 1998; Fleming & Sorenson, 2001), customer demand left unaddressed by 
dominant players in highly concentrated industries (Carroll, 1985; Carroll, Dobrev & 
Swaminathan, 2002), new consumer demand (Dobrev, Ozdemir & Teo, 2006), and 
displaced old industries (Hyatt, Sine & Tolbert, 2009; Dowell & David, 2011).
In recent years, researchers have begun to investigate a distinct category of 
emerging markets: those that form by way of ideological opposition to existing 
industries, for example, the green energy sector (Sine, Haveman & Tolbert, 2005), the 
grass-fed meat and dairy markets (Weber, Heinze & DeSoucey, 2008), microradio 
stations (Greve, Pozner, & Rao, 2006), the organic food industry (Lee, 2009), and the 
traditional whisky distillery market (McKendrick & Hannan, 2013) among others. Such
3 This chapter reprinted with the permission of Olga Khessina, Stansislav Dobrev and 
Jaime Grant
oppositional markets coalesce around collective identities shared by producers who 
define themselves as categorically opposed to the dominant market logic employed by 
incumbent firms in existing product space (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Rao, 2008). 
Adherence to a shared ideology, or the belief system about how the social world should 
operate (Parsons, 1951), sparks social movement dynamics that lead to collective action 
eventually giving rise to new market institutions (Carroll, 1997; Swaminathan & Wade, 
2001; Schneiberg, King & Smith, 2008; King & Pearce, 2010). This process of 
institution building and new market emergence, however, begins with market actors 
seeking to engage their audience by the force of their ideological commitment (Hannan, 
Polos & Carroll, 2007). At the core of that effort lies the consonance of market actors’ 
organizational identities, which cohere around the oppositional message they collectively 
are able to convey.
The burgeoning literature on organizational form identities has shown that firms 
with sharp, resonant identities are better able to engage their audience than firms with 
diffuse, category-spanning identities (McKendrick et al., 2003; Hsu, Hannan & Kocak, 
2009). Focused identities can easily be differentiated from and indeed juxtaposed to 
other identities and, thus, help the firms embodying such identities transform their 
potential intrinsic appeal into actual appeal (Hannan, Polos & Carroll, 2007). Audience 
members are enticed by the singularity of purpose and perceived dedication to specific 
tastes displayed by focused identity firms. Although many studies offer convincing 
evidence in support of this thesis, the actual transition from intrinsic to actual appeal 
seems undertheorized (Hannan, 2010). A typical supposition is that if  a producer focuses 
its offerings on catering to specific tastes of consumers in a narrow market category, that
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producer will garner greater actual appeal from its audience (Zuckerman, 1999; Hsu, 
2006; Negro & Leung, 2013). Yet, the theoretical detail of this supposition appears to be 
a missing link in the extant theory. What mechanisms underpin the transition from 
intrinsic to actual appeal? Based on what we already know, the operative condition 
relates to the tradeoff between breadth and strength of appeal. The sharper and more 
focused a producer’s identity is, the stronger the appeal of that producer’s offerings to the 
focal audience will be (Zuckerman et al., 2003; Hsu, Hannan & Kocak, 2009; Leung & 
Sharkey, 2013).
I conjecture that this supposition should be developed further and scrutinized 
empirically. Specifically, I focus on two related and, I think, underdeveloped conditions. 
First, while I agree with the strength vs. breadth of appeal trade-off, I set to investigate 
what other factors contribute to the effective transformation of intrinsic into actual 
appeal. I do not believe that firms with equally focused offerings carry uniform audience 
appeal. Within a category of focused producers, compliance with the specific categorical 
tenets of the collective identity of the market is a variable and the ability to demonstrate 
high levels of compliance likely increases actual appeal. Second, in addition to the 
benefit of claiming an organizational identity that closely reflects the categorical 
imperatives inherent in a sharp and resonant collective identity, developing such an 
identity is a gradual process that takes time. So, I also investigate the dynamic process of 
identity building, specifically focusing on the role of product names as a means of 
eliciting audience recognition of ideological compliance.
I develop and test arguments in the context of an emerging oppositional market 
because I think this setting is particularly apt for applying my theory. Oppositional
43
markets build around oppositional identities which are sharp and focused by definition 
because they build around a clear antipode to an already established, clearly defined 
identity of the incumbent market (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Barron, 2004). 
Moreover, oppositional markets by their very nature contain a strong ideological 
component invoked as a means of garnering attention and mobilizing resources (Rao, 
2009).
Starting with my first premise, that the appeal of a firm’s offerings increases with 
that firm’s ability to demonstrate ideological compliance to the collective identity, I posit 
that firms will use their product names to convey to the audience claims that their 
organizational identity is attuned to the key logic of an oppositional market. At their 
core, markets are exchange structures between producers and consumers (White, 1992; 
DiMaggio, 1994; Weber et. al, 2008) and products are a key element that connects the 
two together (Carroll, Khessina & McKendrick, 2010). A product’s appeal to consumers 
determines how well the product does on the market and ultimately how well a firm that 
offers this product performs (de Figueiredo & Kyle, 2006). The degree of collective 
appeal of a new class of products in an emerging industry may determine whether this 
industry will stay around or ultimately disappear (Hannan et al., 2007). Yet, what shapes 
the appeal of a product in an oppositional market?
I believe that in oppositional markets rhetoric and language play a crucial role and 
propose that names of products, by embodying linguistically the narrative of an 
oppositional discourse, may significantly shape a product’s appeal to customers. If new 
entrants succeed by staking a reactionary claim about who they are in direct reference to 
a set of established incumbents, the ability to effectively communicate the oppositional
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identity becomes paramount. Serving as a link between producers and their customers, 
product names effectively serve as the means for conveying categorical claims.
Viewing the choice of product names as an identity building mechanism, I 
propose that to establish a strong focused identity a firm must not only satisfy the 
objective criteria for membership in the oppositional category (e.g., craft production 
method in the microbrewing market or minimal pollution in the green energy sector), but 
must also communicate its ideological commitment to its audience. Product names 
afford firms the opportunity to do so at little apparent cost. The existing research on 
names in management theory suggests that names signify categories of meaning, sorting 
social entities such as firms and products in equivalent and nonequivalent sets (Glynn & 
Marquis, 2005; Hannan, Polos & Carroll, 2007; Khessina & Reis, 2013) and, as a result, 
help audiences make sense of social entities independent of their objective characteristics 
(Glynn & Abzug, 2002; Lee, 2001; Barnett, Feng & Luo, 2012). I theorize that in 
oppositional markets certain names make products appear more appealing to customers 
even when they are not tangibly different from other products in their peer category. This 
ability to differentiate products in identity space eventually creates an association with 
the producer thereby shaping its organizational identity.
The second premise, that transforming intrinsic into actual audience appeal is a 
continuous process that hinges on developing a focused organizational identity, suggests 
that while product names can facilitate the establishment of a focused organizational 
identity, they cannot substitute for it. Ultimately, a firm must become recognized as a 
legitimate actor that embodies the identity claims put forth by its product names. In 
addition, as the locus of proving ideological compliance shifts from the product to the
firm, the role of product names in demonstrating categorical congruity with the collective 
identity should diminish. Therefore, I see the process of transforming intrinsic to actual 
appeal as comprising two distinct stages. At the first stage, firms strategically use their 
product names to demonstrate adherence to the ideology embodied in the collective 
identity of a market category. At the second stage, as an organization’s identity as a 
legitimate participant in a market category coheres, the appeal of its offerings hinges less 
on its products’ names and more on its own recognition as an established actor in the 
focal market.
I test my theory on the U.S. craft beer industry. This market emerged in 
unabashed ideological opposition to the incumbent market of large mass producers in the 
1980s and since then has been growing and flourishing. The antimass production 
sentiment has been an essential part of the craft beer market identity, which is centered on 
a sense of small production scale, craft methods and high quality ingredients (Carroll & 
Swaminathan, 2000). What matters the most to consumers is the authentic production of 
craft beer (Carroll & Wheaton, 2009). The discourse based on antimass production 
sentiments shared by beer enthusiasts, craft producers and consumers stimulate lovers of 
specialty beer to continually prefer craft-produced over mass-produced beer (Carroll & 
Swaminathan, 2000).
I think that names of products play an essential part in the discourse surrounding 
craft beer, particularly for new entrants that lack established organizational identities. I 
argue that when a product’s name is aligned with the collective identity of the craft beer 
market, it reinforces the product’s appeal to customers. Specifically, beers with 
oppositional names, defined as names congruent with the collective identity centered on
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an antimass production sentiment, should resonate more strongly with customers’ 
expectations than beers with other names. I thus predict that among focused producers 
with similar products with arguably identical intrinsic appeal, those employing 
oppositional product names will have stronger actual appeal. I also expect that as market 
actors become recognized as legitimate craft producers, the appeal of their offerings will 
increasingly become a function of their organizational identity and will hinge less on the 
names of their products. I find support for these ideas in the longitudinal analysis of all 
beers that were evaluated by consumers on the online website BeerAdvocate.com from 
its inception in 1996 through 2012.
Names in Product Appeal 
To make a purchasing decision, consumers need to determine which products 
among the variety available on the market appeal to them (Rosa et al., 1999). The actual 
appeal of a product is driven by (1) its intrinsic appeal defined as the perceived fit 
between product attributes and a consumer’s taste, and (2) a producer’s engagement of 
consumers with the intent to convert the product’s intrinsic appeal into actual appeal 
(Hannan, Polos & Carroll, 2007). Intrinsic appeal is higher when a product’s 
characteristics important to consumers are aligned with a collective identity of the 
market, i.e., meet audience expectations about what attributes the product in a given 
market should possess (Hannan, Polos & Carroll, 2007). In many industries, objective, 
easily identifiable characteristics are sufficient for consumers to evaluate whether a 
specific product is intrinsically appealing to them (Rao, Monin & Durand, 2003; Weber 
et. al., 2008; Lee, 2009). In other industries, however, physical differences among
products are not significant enough to easily discriminate among various offerings 
(Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Sine, Haveman & Tolbert, 2005; McKendrick & Hannan, 
2013). In such markets, producers’ ability to convert their intrinsic appeal into actual 
appeal hinges on the extent to which producers can engage their audience. I argue that 
product naming is one possible producer engagement practice that may shape a product’s 
actual appeal to customers.
Product naming is an attractive producer engagement practice for two key 
reasons. First, when physical attributes of a product are not sufficiently different from 
those of other products in competing market categories, consumers may look for 
differences in production processes to determine which one is authentic to the market that 
consumers care about (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Baron, 2004; Carroll & Wheaton, 
2009). The production process is, however, not always easily deduced from a product 
(McKendrick & Hannan, 2013). By contrast, a product’s name is highly visible, easily 
available, and often one of the first characteristics that a consumer notices about the 
product. By making an explicit reference to the nature of the production process in a 
product’s name, a producer delivers a message to relevant audiences that this product is 
authentic, i.e., it is congruent with the collective identity of the market. Therefore, a 
product’s name can be used to make identity claims about both the product (Khessina & 
Reis, 2013) and its producer (Phillips & Kim, 2009), and in this way increase the actual 
appeal of the product to relevant audiences (Hannan, Polos & Carroll, 2007). Second, 
naming products is an engagement practice with very little apparent cost to a producer. 
Product naming is a routine organizational operation that neither requires many resources 
nor creates substantial interruptions in the production processes (Delacroix &
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Swaminathan, 1991; Dobrev, 1999).
Based on this discussion, I propose that in markets where the intrinsic appeal of 
producers’ offerings is hard to evaluate, producers will attempt to strengthen their actual 
appeal by engaging consumers through the strategic naming of their products. If  the 
meaning conveyed by the product’s name is congruent with the collective identity of the 
market, that product’s actual appeal to its audience will increase. I further believe that 
product names should have an especially profound effect in oppositional markets, where 
discourse between producers and audiences is a crucial engagement practice and product 
names serve as one important conduit of this discourse.
Oppositional Names and Product Appeal 
In oppositional markets, an organizational form identity is based on the 
oppositional ideology, promoted by collective action that seeks to challenge the 
established authority of incumbents, alter the existing status quo and carry out change on 
a cultural level (Rao, Monin & Durand, 2003; Snow, 2004; Schneiberg, King & Smith, 
2008; Weber, Heinze & DeSoucey, 2008). For example, the rise of craft breweries in the 
United States, often called a microbrewery revolution, represents the evolution of a social 
movement under a collective oppositional identity (Carroll, 1997; Swaminathan & Wade, 
2001; Carroll, Dobrev, & Swaminathan, 2002). This identity has been strategically 
deployed in order to challenge mainstream cultural and institutional norms and educate 
different audiences (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Rao, 2009, Ch.3).
In oppositional markets, customers driven by ideological concerns strongly prefer 
products that are congruent with their ideology (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Greve,
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Pozner & Rao, 2006; Rao, 2009). As a result, identity claims both about products and 
their producers delivered through product names become increasingly important for 
generating actual product appeal. Resonance and authenticity are key dimensions of 
organizational form identity in oppositional markets. Resonant identities ‘capture or 
activate powerful distinctions along social, ethnic, religious, economic, political, and 
cultural lines’ (Baron, 2004: 11). Authentic identities preclude ‘certain alternatives from 
consideration simply on the grounds that they would not be genuine or thinkable, even if 
they might be profitable’ (Baron, 2004: 14). Authentic identities embody broader social 
and moral expectations about how things should work, about what is socially and morally 
appropriate, as opposed to what is most efficient (Hsu & Hannan, 2005). By employing 
product names as a means of delivering a message to customers that a producer uses 
traditional methods (even though they are less efficient than other methods) to make 
products that contrast sharply with incumbent producers, that producer effectively makes 
claims about authenticity that resonate (due to the direct comparison) with the audience 
and conform with the collective identity of the market category.
For craft breweries, the most salient manifestation of the oppositional identity is 
an open antagonism towards the notion of mass production of beer and the breweries that 
produce it. Craft breweries often go to great lengths to use only traditional ingredients 
and artisanal production methods and make only small quantities of beer in an attempt to 
create a high quality authentic product. However, consumers often have trouble 
distinguishing between different beers based solely on taste (Carroll & Swaminathan, 
2000). Instead, producers in this industry make identity claims by engaging consumers 
with deliberate storytelling about the authentic production of craft beers (Rao, 2009).
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Breweries that manage to leverage the antimass production sentiment by developing a 
discourse around their traditional methods of production are considered more authentic 
and of higher quality, and thus are more likely to appeal to consumers both relative to 
large mass producers and to other craft breweries that do not overtly claim an 
oppositional identity.
Product names are an important part of public discourse built around the craft 
brewery collective identity. Many beer names are oppositional and make a clear 
reference to antimass production ideology. For example, Breckenridge Brewery’s Small 
Batch 471 and Morgantown Brewing Company’s Small Batch-Honey Raspberry Amber 
Ale explicitly express the antimass production sentiment by highlighting the fact that the 
beer was produced in small batches. Since a product name plays a key role in how the 
product is perceived (at least initially), oppositional names will contribute more strongly 
to conveying the ideological message implied by producers’ collective identity than other 
names. Therefore, products with oppositional names are likely to be perceived as more 
aligned with the collective identity of the craft beer market than products with other 
names, and thus generate higher actual appeal.
• H1: In oppositional markets, products with oppositional names will have 
higher actual appeal than products with other names.
Prototypes and Strength of Appeal 
Although oppositional naming is an attractive engagement practice for producers 
who seek to make identity claims to relevant audiences, it can be more or less effective 
depending on characteristics of their specific products. Building on the key finding from
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research about the importance of name congruence with expectations of audiences 
(Dobrev, 1999; Glynn & Abzug, 2002; Lee, 2001; Cooper, Gulen & Rau, 2005), I 
propose that the predicted beneficial effect of oppositional names may attenuate and even 
disappear, if  relevant audiences see an oppositional name as incongruent with the 
characteristics of the product. I consider one key product feature, the similarity to a 
prototypical incumbent product, which may drive such incongruence and diminish and 
even eliminate the benefits of an oppositional name.
In interpreting the oppositional discourse in a market, it is important to define 
clearly the reference category, in other words oppositional to what? Understanding the 
key features of the incumbent category is essential because an oppositional category must 
be focused on targeting these very features and must offer specific counter-alternatives to 
them (Schneiberg, King & Smith, 2008; Hyatt, Sine & Tolbert, 2009; Rao, 2009). This 
mode of differentiation with recourse to established producers is what helps new market 
entrants eventually cohere into a new producer category (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; 
Weber et. al., 2008). Firms vying for membership in an oppositional market typically 
center attention on the prototypical product in the offerings of incumbents and strive to 
offer an antipode (Greve, Pozner, & Rao, 2006; Negro, Hannan & Rao, 2011; Hollands & 
Vail, 2012). A prototypical product includes the most salient features associated with its 
category and these central features, when countered by reactionary market actors, provide 
sharp and focused contrast to the original (Baron, 2004). A prototype can be countered 
tangibly, in terms of objective product characteristics, and cognitively, by distinguishing 
it categorically from the original. Hypothesis 1 is about the beneficial effect of the latter, 
even when objective product characteristics are the same.
52
The next hypothesis is predicated on the argument that even when antipode 
products are entirely different from incumbent products in production techniques, the 
sheer overlap in product space between the two may curtail the categorical detachment 
that oppositional names help to articulate. In other words, the risk in making a product 
similar (albeit only superficially) to an incumbent’s prototypical product is that even 
when successfully countered in terms of the feature set comprising the prototype 
category, an overlap in the less salient, broader features of the offerings (e.g., similar 
class or type of product) may create a cognitive association between incumbent and 
oppositional products (Barron, 2004). Such association would then undermine the effort 
to cognitively distance the oppositional product from the incumbent by using an 
oppositional name. This happens because relevant audiences do not associate 
oppositional ideology with products that are similar to prototypical incumbent products. 
The use of oppositional names in such products is seen as incongruent with product 
characteristics; it violates audience expectations and is unlikely to increase product actual 
appeal.
In the brewing industry, the prototype of a mass-produced beer is associated with 
automated production, large quantities, and limited variety. Firms in the oppositional 
craft beer market objectively depart from that prototype by strictly adhering to craft 
production techniques, small batch production and a healthy variety of beer style 
offerings. Despite (and in fact as part of) these clear differences in production, many 
craft breweries also offer a type of beer known as American lager which happens to be 
the beer style almost exclusively offered by the mass producers (18 of the 20 beers with
the largest market share in the U.S. are still American lagers4). The craft lagers are 
different from the mass produced ones because they are brewed by artisanal methods 
with traditional ingredients. The identity of craft breweries should send signals to the 
market regarding the authenticity and quality of these lagers. However, this is not 
necessarily the case. Barlow and Verhaal (2013) found that craft beers in the American 
lager category have lower consumer appeal because they are implicitly associated with 
mass-produced beers that dominate this product space. Despite clear differences along 
all key prototype features between mass and craft-produced American lagers (scale, 
production methods, etc.), sharing a broad product category fosters consumer biases, 
either intentionally or unknowingly, against craft lagers because of the implicit 
association with products from the incumbent industry. This association undermines the 
identity claims put forth by craft beer producers and, thus, devalues the categorical 
detachment that oppositional names are intended to establish. Based on this discussion I 
predict the following:
• H2: In oppositional markets, the beneficial effect o f a product’s
oppositional name on actual appeal will be lower for products associated 
with prototypical products in the incumbent market.
Organizational Identities and Strength of Appeal 
Oppositional naming becomes less important as an engagement practice of 
transforming a product’s intrinsic into actual appeal when more salient indicators for 
making inferences about the firm’s products become available to audiences. I believe 
that an organizational identity is one such indicator.
4 INFORMS (www.beerinsights.com)
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Organizations become known for what they are through interactions with all of 
their audiences, but mostly their customers. The more consumers learn about a firm, the 
greater basis they have to make informed decisions about buying its offerings. A nascent 
organization is disadvantaged because its lack o f track record makes it difficult for 
audiences to understand and evaluate its products. This disadvantage is at the core of 
Stinchcombe’s (1965) liability o f newness thesis which emphasizes the ‘lack of 
legitimacy’ as an impediment to young organizations. Yet, although age may be a logical 
proxy, it is not aging per se that alleviates this disadvantage, but the experience that an 
organization accumulates through its interaction with relevant audiences. Over time, as 
such experience accumulates, there emerges a set o f stable expectations among the key 
audience about the purpose o f the organization and its raison d ’etre. Eventually, social 
consensus about these expectations solidifies. This is the process by which a firm 
develops an organizational identity (Polos, Hannan & Carroll, 2002).
Once a set o f stable expectations about what the organization is forms on the basis 
of that learning and experience, appeal o f the firm’s products becomes clearly tied to 
these expectations. That is, intrinsic appeal materializes into actual appeal as a function 
of the emergent organizational identity which conforms to the collective codes o f the 
market category that the firm seeks membership in (Hannan, Polos & Carroll, 2007). 
There is the inherent duality underlying strength o f appeal: an organization must develop 
its unique identity, yet this identity must conform to the codes and features o f the 
collective identity o f its market category. This process is largely driven by the 
experience and recognition that audience members gain about the organization. 
Consequently, the actual appeal o f products should be higher for firms whose identities
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are closely aligned with the collective identity in the market. In other words, firms that 
become synonymous with their market will have a strong positional advantage over their 
competitors in that market.
For example, in the empirical context of the craft beer market, breweries develop 
a strong oppositional identity when audiences believe that the firms use traditional 
production methods. The authenticity of craft production is tied to a producer’s ability to 
offer a variety of beer styles. That product variety is considered evidence for mastery of 
the craft and is an essential feature of the oppositional identity of craft producers; it 
stands in stark contrast to the very narrow offerings of mass producers (Carroll & 
Swaminathan, 2000). Accordingly, the number of beer styles that a brewery has offered 
is a factor that forges its oppositional identity formation.
Another important factor necessary for solidifying an identity is the firm’s 
prolonged interaction with and public recognition by relevant audiences (Hannan, Polos 
& Carroll, 2007). In my empirical setting -  an online community of beer enthusiasts 
rating their experience with craft beers -  the most direct evidence of social interaction 
between a producer (i.e., a craft brewery) and its key audience (i.e., beer enthusiasts) is 
the total number of reviews that a brewery has received across all of its offerings over 
time. The cumulative number of reviews garnered by a brewery captures the extent to 
which its recognition both as a social entity and as a member of the craft beer market 
category has developed. It also clearly signals the audience engagement accomplished by 
the brewery.
To reiterate, my central proposition is that actual appeal of a product will increase 
as an organization’s identity develops and conforms to the broader collective identity in
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the market category. Building a strong identity is a gradual process which is primarily 
driven by the organization’s capacity to demonstrate continuous compliance with the 
collective codes of the market category where it seeks membership. This capacity hinges 
on the exposure to and interaction with the audience. In oppositional markets, product 
actual appeal rises with the strength of its firm’s oppositional identity, and thus should 
increase with (1) the firm’s ability to fulfill the codes of the collective oppositional 
identity (e.g., a brewery is acknowledged for its diverse offerings); and (2) the extent of 
audience engagement the firm can accomplish (e.g., cumulative number of online reviews 
across a brewery’s entire product offerings).
• H3a: In oppositional markets, the actual appeal o f a firm ’s products is an 
increasing function o f that firm ’s fulfillment o f the codes o f the collective 
oppositional identity.
• H3b: In oppositional markets, the actual appeal o f a firm ’s products is an 
increasing function o f that firm ’s recognition by the audience.
I think that product names are a powerful tool that organizations can use to make 
a membership claim in a market category and develop an identity. Product names 
facilitate the coherence of an organizational identity because products offer a 
communication platform on which producers and audiences learn about each other and 
gain experience with each other. However, while product names allow the firm to make 
claims about its emergent identity and rite of passage into the focal market category, once 
that organizational identity solidifies and the firm’s category membership status becomes 
taken for granted, the importance of product names should subside, as audiences start 
making inferences about the firm’s offerings based on its organizational identity:
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• H4a: In oppositional markets, the beneficial effect o f oppositional product 
names on the actual appeal a f irm ’s products is a decreasing function o f 
that firm ’s fulfillment o f the codes o f the collective oppositional identity.
• H4b: In oppositional markets, the beneficial effect o f oppositional product 
names on the actual appeal o f a firm ’s products is a decreasing function 
o f that firm ’s recognition by the audience.
Empirical Setting
I test the developed hypotheses on the population of beers produced by American 
craft breweries. The Brewer’s Association, which is considered to be the authority on 
craft brewing and microbrews in the United States, 5 officially classifies a beer producer 
as a craft brewer only if  it produces less than 6 million barrels of beer per year. The craft 
brewing industry is further partitioned into two market size segments: microbreweries 
and brewpubs that produce less than 15,000 barrels of beer per year and regional 
breweries that produce between 15,000 and 6 million barrels per year. Breweries that 
produce more than 6 million barrels per year are considered to be mass production 
breweries, and cannot be called a craft brewery6.
The craft brewing market in the U.S. emerged in the 1980s and saw tremendous
5 The Brewer’s Association is an advocate for craft breweries. It serves as a lobbyist, 
publisher and organizer of the two largest beer festivals in the world: the Great American 
Beer Festival and the World Beer Cup.
6 This threshold was recently changed by the Brewer’s Association, and had previously 
been 2 million barrels per year. However, as large regional breweries, such as Boston 
Beer Company (i.e., Sam Adams), began to reach this production limit, the limit was 
increased to include them. At the same time, lawmakers from Massachusetts also 
successfully lobbied Congress to extend current tax breaks for craft breweries to include 
production up to 6 million barrels per year.
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growth in the ensuing years. This phenomenon is well documented in previous research 
(e.g., Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Rao, 2009, Ch.3) and represents a clear example of 
resource partitioning, whereby consolidation of mass producers that sold homogenized 
‘industrial’ beer opened a resource space on the periphery of the market for the 
proliferation of specialist microbreweries and brewpubs that differentiated themselves 
based on technical product dimensions, such as taste and ingredients (Carroll, 1985; 
Carroll, Dobrev & Swaminathan, 2002). The emergence of microbreweries and 
brewpubs gave rise to a social movement that promoted the idea of an imperative for 
tradition and authenticity in beer brewing. The organizational form identity based on 
tradition and authenticity has largely prevented the large mass producers from 
encroaching on the specialist resource space and winning over microbrew consumers.
This happened even though over time mass breweries learnt to remove the technical 
impediments that at first objectively disadvantaged their products relative to craft beers. 
As a result, it is now seen as an identity constraint. Consumers of specialty beer often 
refuse to buy products brewed by mass producers because they believe that mass 
producers focus more on profits than on quality and hence make only low-quality beer 
(Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000).7
Craft brewers offer a variety of different products within a broad range of beer 
categories. Indeed, it is not uncommon for even the smallest microbrewery to offer 
multiple styles of beer that all require different ingredients and brewing techniques. For
7 Thus, the previous research on the craft beer industry focused on either the industry 
dynamics driven by the resource partitioning processes or on the differences between 
generalist mass producers and specialist craft breweries documenting many advantages of 
specialists over generalists. It has not, however, explored what drives performance 
differences within the segment of specialist craft breweries. By contrast, my goal is to 
uncover factors that may create the variance among craft breweries.
example, Epic Brewing Company located in Salt Lake City, Utah is a relatively small 
microbrewery that was founded in 2010. Since it commenced its operation, it has already 
produced over 40 different beers that span the entire range of beer styles. This includes: 
stouts, American lagers, barleywine, pumpkin ale, Belgian ales, fruit beers, and even 
organic and gluten-free styles. This sense of diversity, originality and playfulness in the 
brewing process is a hallmark of the craft beer movement’s collective identity.
One way this identity is reinforced is through product names and labels. There 
are internet forums, message boards, and even whole websites dedicated to the discussion 
of cool names of craft beer. Some of them even conduct beer name competitions (e.g., 
www.aleheads.com). Consumers like interesting names and some even believe that a 
cool name may make their beer drinking a more rewarding experience.
Data Sources
In order to test how oppositional names of craft beers impact product appeal to 
consumers, I use consumers’ ratings of beer. Consumers provide ratings to declare the 
value they attach to a firm’s product (Zeithaml, 1988; Kovacs, Carroll & Lehman, 2013). 
Such value ratings are one manifestation of product appeal (Kovacs & Hannan, 2011). 
They tend to shape consumer product choices (Sweeney & Soutar, 2001) and 
consequently affect organizational performance (Luca, 2011). With the continued 
proliferation of the Internet as a means of communication and interaction, consumer 
value ratings have been increasingly declared in public forums through online reviews 
that are posted on review websites. These websites have recently become a popular data 
source for studies on product and organizational appeal (e.g., Kovacs, Carroll & Lehman,
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2013; Kovacs & Hannan, 2011; Luca, 2011).
The reviews for this study come from the online beer review website 
BeerAdvocate (www.beeradvocate.com). BeerAdvocate has been in existence since 
1996 and has data on ratings on over 83,000 different beers from all over the world. As 
of January, 2013, it has totaled 2.7 million reviews. These reviews were written by 
25,974 unique users, for which the average number of reviews was 45.6 with a maximum 
number of reviews of 3,960. In 2013, BeerAdvocate received on average 25 million page 
views from 2.5 million unique visitors per month.
On BeerAdvocate, any user can create an account and then rate and write a review 
about a beer listed in the database. Reviewers can rate beers across four specific 
dimensions: look, smell, taste, and feel on a 1-to-5 scale (they can also provide an 
‘overall’ score), as well as write additional commentary and critique about each 
dimension. Once a user gains a certain amount of reviewing experience and legitimacy 
on the website, s/he can suggest a new beer for review that has not been incorporated into 
the online database yet. The website uses a developed classification framework and 
places newly suggested beers into appropriate style categories before making them 
available for reviewing.
BeerAdvocate is an appropriate data source for testing my hypotheses for several 
reasons. First, the website is broadly recognized by mass media (e.g., the New York 
Times, USA Today, Boston Globe) and by Alexa Internet Inc. (a leading company that 
tracks web traffic data) as one of the two largest online beer review sites and online beer 
communities in the world. The other largest online website, RateBeer, was founded in 
2000. Second, BeerAdvocate provides detailed information about reviews, reviewers,
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beers, and breweries, such as, for example, beer style, beer review score, date o f beer 
review and so on. It covers a great variety o f beers, including very rare ones. Finally, 
BeerAdvocate is popular among craft beer enthusiasts and beer lovers and, thus, allows 
us to look at the effect o f oppositional names on the audience for which these products 
are intended.
For the purposes o f this study, the data are restricted to the U.S. craft breweries 
only (i.e., production less that 6 million barrels per year), and represents the entire 
population o f reviews o f these organizations and their beers from the website’s inception 
in 1996 through May o f 2012. The final dataset consists o f 1,151,627 unique reviews of 
41,982 different beers produced by 1,932 unique craft breweries. The data are 
aggregated at the beer-year level, and the final dataset consists o f 104,491 beer-year 
observations.
Operationalization o f Variables 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable in this study is beer audience 
appeal. This measure is based on reviews o f beers provided by customers on 
BeerAdvocate. It was calculated in two steps. First, for each review o f any specific beer, 
I calculated the average o f scores that a reviewer provided. An individual reviewer 
evaluates a beer on a scale o f 1-to-5 (in increments o f 0.25) based on four dimensions: 
look, smell, taste, and feel. I took the mean o f these four component scores for each 
review. Second, I aggregated all reviews that a specific beer received in a given year and 
calculated the beer’s average review score in a given year. The resulting measure o f beer 
audience appeal is a time-variant continuous variable ranging from 1 to 5.
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Independent variables. The key independent variable is beer oppositional name, 
which is a time-invariant dummy that takes the value of 1 if the name of a beer contains 
an antimass production reference. I consider an antimass production reference to be any 
word that highlights the key features associated with the oppositional collective identity 
of the craft beer market, such as, small-scale production, artisanality, exclusivity, 
authenticity, and quality. These words include the following: aged, anniversary, 
authentic, barrel, barreled, batch, cask, cellar, classic, commemorative, craft, cuvee, 
edition, farmhouse, grand, limited, oak, old, reserve, select, special, traditional, unique, 
and vintage. Table 3.1 provides frequencies and justification for each antimass 
production reference used to construct the beer oppositional name variable.
Other independent variables include the following. American lager is a time- 
invariant dummy that takes the value of 1 if the style of a given beer is in the American 
lager category. This category includes the following sub-styles of beer: American 
Adjunct lager, American red lager, American imperial pilsner, American pale lager, 
California common/steam beer, and American light lager. This variable measures the 
categorical association of a given craft beer with the prototypical incumbent product -  
American larger.
To measure the extent to which a brewery complies with the collective identity 
code of producing a variety of craft beers, I created the variable brewery cumulative beer 
count as the cumulative number of unique beers for which the brewery received at least 
one review on BeerAdvocate since the website founding by a given year. To measure the 
extent of a brewery’s recognition by its key audience, beer enthusiasts and lovers, I 
created the variable brewery cumulative reviews, which is the number of cumulative
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reviews that a given brewery received on BeerAdvocate since the website’s founding by 
a given year. These two variables are updated annually and lagged one year to avoid the 
simultaneity issue.
Control variables. Product, firm and industry characteristics may all affect the 
appeal of a product to consumers (Carroll, Khessina & McKendrick, 2010). Several 
controls are used to account for these influences. Unless otherwise noted, all time-variant 
variables are updated annually and lagged one year to avoid the simultaneity issue.
Product controls. Long beer names that consist of many words have a higher 
probability to include a word that references an antimass sentiment than short beer names 
that consist of one or few words. To control for this influence I created a time-invariant 
variable beer name word count which is the number of words in a beer’s name. This 
count excludes stop words, such as, ‘a,’ ‘the,’ ‘and,’ ‘or’ and prepositions. To control for 
differences in a beer’s average appeal due to the level of attention that the beer receives 
from consumers I created the variable beer cumulative reviews, which is the cumulative 
number of reviews that a beer has received on the website by a given year.
Organizational controls. Size of a producer may affect the appeal of its products 
to consumers. In the craft beer industry, consumers prefer beverages made by smaller 
breweries (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000). To control for this influence, I created the 
variable measuring a brewery’s size as a scale of its operations. Since I was able to 
obtain data on production volume for less than 75% of breweries, I constructed a brewery 
size variable based on whether or not a given craft brewery was a regional brewery or a 
microbrewery. The Brewers Association maintains a list, updated yearly, of all regional 
breweries in the industry. With these data, I built the variable regional brewery as a
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dummy that takes the value of 1 if a given brewery was considered regional in a given 
year (i.e., produced more than 15,000, but less than 6 million barrels) and the value of 
zero if otherwise.
The degree to which a brewery uses traditional ingredients can impact perceptions 
of authenticity within the craft beer community. In its purest form, the four primary 
ingredients in beer are water, hops, malt, and barley. Therefore, the use of adjunct cereal 
grains in the brewing process (as a means of both cost reduction and muting the strong 
flavor of hops in certain beers) has been treated by the Brewer’s Association as being 
contradictory to the underlying tenets of the craft beer identity. Therefore, I control for 
the breweries that are known to use these adjunct ingredients in some or all of their beers 
by creating dummy variable adjunct brewery which takes a value of 1 if the brewery has 
been identified by the Brewer’s Association as using these types of ingredients.
The degree to which a brewery remains independently owned is also viewed as an 
identity constraint in the craft beer industry. Consolidation is a hallmark of the mass 
production beer market, and some of these mass producers have sought to gain inroads 
into the craft beer market by acquiring either a part of or a whole craft brewery. Brewer’s 
Association sees craft breweries that are more than 25% owned by firms that are not craft 
breweries as counter to the ideal of the craft beer community. Therefore, I created the 
dummy variable acquired brewery that takes the value of 1 beginning the year that a craft 
brewery either has crossed the 25% non-independence threshold or has been fully 
acquired by a mass producer.
An additional characteristic differentiating breweries within the craft beer 
industry is whether or not a brewery contracts some or all of its production out to other
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breweries. Craft breweries that contract out their beer production are seen by beer 
enthusiasts as ‘stealth,’ ‘pretend,’ ‘fake,’ and ‘faux’ breweries (Cottone, 1995) and are 
perceived as violating the expectations of the collective identity of the craft beer market 
(Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000). To control for this influence I created the dummy 
variable contract brewery that takes the value of 1 if a brewery contracts some or all of 
its production out.
Past public success of a brewery may affect the appeal of its current beers. To 
account for this effect I created the variable brewery cumulative medals won, which is the 
cumulative number of medals that a brewery won at the Great American Beer Festival by 
a given year. This measure is discounted by 20% per year, to reflect that medals received 
recently contribute more strongly to the audience perception of firm success than the 
medals received in the more distant past. Results hold whether this control is discounted 
or not. The length of time that a brewery has been actively reviewed on the website may 
impact the appeal of its subsequent beers. The variable brewery time since first review, 
measured as the number of years since the first review for a given brewery was posted on 
BeerAdvocate, accounts for this influence.
While BeerAdvocate was started in 1996, a number of breweries in the population 
were founded prior to 1996. To account for possible differences in beer appeal of such 
breweries, I created the time-invariant dummy variable pre-1996 brewery, which takes 
the value of one if a brewery was founded before 1996. Additionally, as a robustness 
check, I reran all the analyses only on breweries that entered since 1996 with the identical 
results.
Industry  controls. Proliferation of products on the market may drive both
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legitimation and competition processes, and thus affect product appeal in a non­
monotonic way (Greenstein & Wade, 1998; de Figueiredo & Kyle, 2006; Khessina & 
Carroll, 2008). The variable density o f beers and its squared term, measured respectively 
as the total number of beers that received at least one review on BeerAdvocate in a given 
year and its square, account for this influence. To account for the effect of other temporal 
differences on beer appeal I include year dummies in all models. Additionally, to control 
for the impact that differences in alcohol regulation and beer consumption patterns across 
states may have on beer appeal I include state dummies in all analyses.
Specification. The data are structured as an unbalanced panel with multiple 
observations of different length for each beer. When testing the hypotheses, it is 
necessary to take into account that each beer’s observations are possibly autocorrelated 
across years because of permanent but unobserved brewery-level characteristics. These 
correlations violate the assumption of independence across observations necessary for 
ordinary least squares regression. To address this issue, I use a population-average 
technique, specifically, the method of generalized estimating equations (GEE) which 
allows us to model the variance both between beers and across time for each beer.
First introduced by Liang and Zeger (1986), and Zeger, Liang, and Albert (1988), 
GEE estimators produce consistent, asymptotically normal solutions even in cases with 
misspecification of the covariance structure of the panel data (Sullivan, Haunschild & 
Page, 2007). Consequently, GEE offers two advantages over fixed- or random-effect 
models when autocorrelation due to nonindependence is present: it does not assume that 
the dependent variable is normally distributed, and it is more robust than other panel data 
specifications because it offers multiple correlation matrix structures to best match the
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data (Liang & Zeger, 1986). GEE is commonly used in analyses of longitudinal data 
with nonnormal dependent variables (Ballinger, 2004).
I use Stata to estimate the GEE models. To further relax the assumption of 
independence of observations within a beer, I calculate robust standard errors clustered 
on a beer based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator (Huber, 1967; White, 1981), 
which is appropriate for using in GEE regressions because it is insensitive to the choice 
of GEE correlation structure (Katila & Chen, 2008).
Results
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics for variables used in analyses. The file 
contains multiple observations for each beer, and thus does not always reflect intuitively 
the experiences of beers on the market. Because I lagged all time-variant variables by 
one year, I lose (1) all beer records in the last observation year of the data and (2) beers 
with single-year observations. The final dataset used for all analyses consists of 53,031 
beer-year observations on 18,044 unique beers made by 1,558 breweries.
Table 3.3 present GEE estimates for testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. Model 3.1 is a 
baseline model. Controls show common effects in expected directions. At the industry 
level, the density of beers shows a U-shaped influence on product appeal. At the 
organizational level, beers produced by regional breweries, contract breweries, acquired 
breweries, and breweries that use adjunct ingredients all have lower appeal, whereas 
beers offered by breweries that were founded before 1996 generate higher appeal. 
Furthermore, the greater the number of cumulative medals won by a given brewery the 
greater its beer appeal, while the longer a brewery has been on the BeerAdvocate website,
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the lower its beer appeal. At the product level, beers with more cumulative reviews and 
longer names both have higher appeal, while beers in the American lager category are 
strongly less appealing.
Model 3.2 tests Hypothesis 1 by introducing a dummy variable that measures 
whether a beer’s name is oppositional, i.e., has a reference to antimass production 
sentiments. The coefficient is positive and highly significant suggesting that beers with 
oppositional names generate significantly greater consumer appeal than beers with other 
names. This finding supports Hypothesis 1.
Model 3.3 tests Hypothesis 2 predicting that craft beers produced in a style which 
is closely associated with prototypical styles of incumbent mass producers will benefit 
less from having an oppositional name than craft beers in nonprototypical styles. The 
interaction between the oppositional name variable and the American lager beer style 
dummy (i.e., a prototypical style closely associated with incumbent and noncraft 
breweries) tests for this prediction. As expected, the interaction coefficient is negative 
and significant. It is interesting that the size of this interaction coefficient is so large that 
it almost completely overrides the main beneficial effect of an oppositional name, 
indicating that an oppositional name brings no appeal benefits to a craft beer made in an 
American larger style. This finding suggests that in oppositional industries, consumers 
perceive products that are similar to prototypical incumbent products as incongruent with 
oppositional collective identity. When such products have oppositional names they 
violate expectations of audiences and, as a result, audiences penalize such products by the 
displayed lack of appeal despite the products’ oppositional names. This finding offers a 
strong support to Hypothesis 2.
Table 3.4 presents GEE estimates for testing Hypotheses 3a- 4b. Model 4.1 tests 
for Hypothesis 3a by adding the variable brewery cumulative beer count that measures 
the extent to which a brewery fulfills collective codes of craft brewing oppositional 
identity. The coefficient is positive and significant. It supports the notion that in 
oppositional markets, adhering to collective codes of the market oppositional identity 
increases actual appeal of the producer’s products. In this context, creating a number of 
different beers suggests to consumers that a given brewery is an authentic craft producer. 
Thus, Hypothesis 3a is supported.
Model 4.2 tests for Hypothesis 3b by adding the variable brewery cumulative 
reviews, which measures the extent of a brewery’s recognition by audiences on 
BeerAdvocate. The coefficient is positive and significant. It shows that the appeal for a 
brewery’s beers increase with the degree of recognition and interaction that the brewery 
has with its key audience. Thus, Hypothesis 3b is supported. It is interesting that while 
the effect of cumulative brewery reviews is positive and significant, the control for the 
time since a brewery’s first review is negative and significant. These two effects 
considered together suggest that it is not sufficient for a brewery to be simply present on 
the market to generate high appeal products; the brewery must engage in active 
interactions with audience members through the process of continually accumulating 
reviews.
Model 4.3 tests Hypothesis 4a by introducing the interaction between the variable 
beer oppositional name and the variable brewery cumulative beer count. The interaction 
is negative and significant, and thus shows that the beneficial effect of oppositional 
names for beers decreases, as their brewery develops its organizational identity through
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the increasing conformance to the codes of the collective oppositional identity. Thus, 
Hypothesis 4a is supported.
Model 4.4 tests Hypothesis 4b by introducing the interaction between the variable 
beer oppositional name and the variable brewery cumulative reviews. The coefficient is 
negative and significant, and thus shows that greater audience recognition of a given 
brewery attenuates the beneficial effect of oppositional names on the appeal of the firm’s 
beers. Thus, Hypothesis 4b is supported. Finally, Model 4.5 is fully saturated and 
includes all predicted effects together. Importantly, all hypothesized effects remain 
significant in expected directions, offering further support to my hypotheses.
Discussion
I began with the question of what shapes the appeal of a product in an 
oppositional market. I proposed that when audiences cannot easily differentiate among 
products based solely on product physical attributes, they rely on ideological discourse 
about the production process. I argued that product names, by embodying linguistically 
the narrative of this discourse play a significant role in shaping actual appeal of 
oppositional products to customers. Specifically, I predicted that when products have 
names that are congruent with the collective identity of an oppositional market, they have 
higher appeal to consumers. This beneficial effect is attenuated and may even disappear 
when (1) audience expectations about what type of product should or should not have an 
oppositional name are violated, and (2) when a firm develops a strong organizational 
identity and an audience starts to rely on this identity to make inferences about the firm’s 
products and production process. I find support for the theorizing in the longitudinal
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analyses of products’ appeal to consumers in the U.S. craft beer industry, 1996-2012.
This industry emerged in ideological opposition to the incumbent market of large mass 
producers. Its collective identity has been centered on the antimass production sentiment 
expressed in a small production scale, craft methods and high quality ingredients.
The analyses revealed three key findings. First, as predicted, craft beers with 
oppositional names, defined as names with an antimass production reference, are 
significantly more appealing to beer drinkers than craft beers with other names. Second, 
this benefit may decrease and even completely disappear if  audiences see the oppositional 
name as incongruent with product characteristics. Specifically, I found that if  a beer is an 
American lager, it does not benefit from having an oppositional name. This happens 
because a craft American lager is perceived by consumers as too similar to the 
prototypical incumbent product of the mass-producer market. Consumers do not 
associate American lagers with the oppositional ideology and when they see such 
products carrying oppositional names, their expectations get violated. As a result, 
oppositional names do not increase the appeal of such beers.
Third, producers that develop strong organizational identity benefit from 
oppositional names less. Specifically, I found that breweries that were able to 
communicate the fact that they adhered to the codes of the collective oppositional 
identity, enjoyed higher audience appeal for their beers, but benefited significantly less 
from giving their products oppositional names. Similarly, breweries that acquired a high 
extent of audience notice and recognition experienced higher product appeal, but 
benefited significantly less from giving their products oppositional names. I suggest that 
the mechanism driving these two findings is rooted in the role that oppositional names
play in the building of organizational identity in ideological markets. When a firm does 
not have an established organizational identity, it benefits from projecting to audiences its 
compliance with the collective identity of the market by naming its products in ways that 
highlight the market oppositional ideology. However, once the firm develops a strong 
identity, audiences start relying more on firm identity to make inferences about the firm 
and its products rather than on product names and the importance of oppositional names 
diminishes.
When generalizing these findings, one should keep in mind limitations common 
to all one industry studies. For example, the operationalization of an oppositional name 
is context-specific, as it is based on the antimass production sentiment. Ideology in other 
oppositional markets may center on different issues, e.g., antipollution in the green 
energy sector, and oppositional names in such markets should be operationalized 
accordingly. Future studies on markets with different oppositional ideologies are 
necessary to test for generalizability of my theoretical construct across diverse contexts. 
Fortunately, there appear to be an increasing number of these oppositional industries 
gaining in prominence, such as, microdistilleries, artisan cheese producers, farm to table 
restaurants, and custom bicycle, snowboard and surfboard manufacturers among others. 
Next, the craft beer market is oriented toward a specific segment of consumers within a 
broader market. Indeed, this paper expressly targets a specific audience: craft beer 
enthusiasts. The name dynamics may be different in oppositional markets oriented to 
other businesses. Oppositional names may matter less in such industries, as businesses 
may evaluate product appeal using different criteria than consumers. Finally, 
oppositional names should matter more in oppositional markets that offer services, as it is
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harder to evaluate services than physical products before purchase and oppositional 
names may help consumers make a choice.
Keeping these limitations in mind, this study contributes to several literatures. 
First, the study contributes to the emerging literature on product names. This literature 
has found that products names affect product financial performance (Zhao, Ishihara & 
Lounsbury, 2013) and product survival (Khessina & Reis, 2013), but did not study 
specific mechanisms that drive these differences in performance. Product appeal to 
consumers shapes both financial success and market longevity of products (Carroll, 
Khessina & McKendrick, 2010). To my knowledge, this paper is the first to look at how 
a product’s name shapes its appeal to consumers. Additionally, by showing how 
oppositional names impact product appeal, this study is the first to identify the 
importance of oppositional names in these types of markets.
This paper has important implications for product demography research -  the 
literature that systematically studies product vital rates, such as, rates of product launch, 
growth and withdrawal from the market (Carroll, Khessina & McKendrick, 2010). 
Although scholars have found that many factors may affect product vital rates, specific 
mechanisms driving these effects remain underexplored. Product appeal to customers 
molds product market fates (Hannan, Polos & Carroll, 2007). By explaining the role of 
oppositional names in product appeal I suggest one mechanism, through oppositional 
names, that may drive product vital rates.
Next, the study contributes to the literature on organizational form identity (the 
collective market identity) by explaining how firms can perceptually reinforce their 
membership in an organizational form by naming their products in ways congruent with
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the market ideology. I showed that product naming can function as an identity building 
tool. I also contribute to the literature on organizational categorization in general. Much 
research in this literature has focused on consequences of category spanning and 
advantages of having a crisp category membership (e.g., Zuckerman, 1999; Hsu, 2006; 
Hsu, Hannan & Ko9ak, 2010; Negro, Hannan & Rao, 2010, 2011; Kovacs & Hannan, 
2011), but not much is known about how a firm can strategically achieve this sharp 
categorization in the perception of audiences. By showing that names congruent with the 
ideological discourse in the market make products more appealing to customers, I suggest 
that strategic naming of products can be one way for a firm to attain perceptually crisp 
category membership.
This study also contributes to the literature on specialist and generalist 
organizations (e.g., literatures on resource partitioning and niche width (for review, 
Carroll, Dobrev, & Swaminathan, 2002). This literature has focused on either the 
industry dynamics driven by the resource partitioning processes or on the differences 
between generalists and specialists. It is much less known what drives performance 
differences within the segment of specialists. By showing that oppositional names may 
shape product appeal I identify a crucial factor that creates variance among specialists in 
oppositional markets.
Finally, this study has important practical implications for how firms can 
strategically make their products more appealing to consumers in oppositional markets. 
Managers can significantly increase their product appeal if  they give their products 
oppositional names. However, they have to be aware of important limitations of this 
strategic practice and avoid giving oppositional names to products that are too similar to
prototypical incumbent products. They should be also aware that the effectiveness of 
oppositional names diminishes as an organization acquires a strong organizational 
identity.
There are a number of related research questions for the future research. For 
example, it is important to understand the role of oppositional product names in 
nonoppositional markets or in well-established incumbent industries. Another interesting 
question is whether firms with oppositional names enjoy the same benefits in consumer 
appeal as products with oppositional names. Yet another fascinating question concerns 
whether consumers are consciously aware of oppositional product names or whether 
these identity-based cues subconsciously create a positive reaction to a given product. 
Future research could address these and other related issues to fully understand the role of 









Antimass Production Sentiment 
Conveyed
Barrel(ed) 2080 Small-scale production, Artisanality
Old 1819 Artisanality, Exclusivity
Aged 1736 Artisanality, Exclusivity
Anniversary 975 Exclusivity
Special 873 Exclusivity, Quality
Oak 749 Small-scale production, Artisanality
Reserve 684 Exclusivity, Quality
Batch 358 Small-scale production, Artisanality
Grand Cru 273 Exclusivity, Quality
Farmhouse 249 Artisanality, Authenticity
Premium 195 Exclusivity, Quality
Classic 132 Artisanality, Quality
Select 122 Exclusivity
Cask 121 Small-scale production, Artisanality
Vintage 102 Artisanality, Exclusivity
Cuvee 98 Artisanality, Exclusivity
Traditional 67 Artisanality, Authenticity
Limited Edition 64 Exclusivity, Quality
Cellar 61 Artisanality
Craft 18 Artisanality, Quality, Authenticity
Commemorative 14 Exclusivity




Descriptive Statistics o f Oppositional Names
Variables Mean St. Dev Min Max
Beer Audience Appeal (t) 3.7 0.47 1 5
Density of Beers/1,000 (t-1) 11.12 4.78 0.045 18.92
Pre-1996 Breweries=l 0.24 0.43 0 1
Regional Brewery = 1 (t-1) 0.37 0.48 0 1
Contract Brewery = 1 0.04 0.20 0 1
Adjunct Brewery = 1 0.03 0.16 0 1
Acquired Brewery = 1 (t-1) 0.04 0.2 0 1
Brewery Cumulati ve Medals Won (tt.) 1.95 4.57 0 45.31
Brewery Time Since First Review (t-1) 6.18 3.14 1 16
Beer Cumulati ve Reviews/ID (tt) 0.57 1.45 0.01 30.48
Beer Name Word Count 3.04 1.38 1 13
Beer Style: American Lager = 1 0.04 0.2 0 1
Oppositi onal Name = 1 0.08 0.27 0 1
Brewery Cumulati ve Beer Count/100 (t-1) 0.42 0.64 0.01 8.47
Brewery Cumulati ve Reviews/1,000 (tt) 1.72 3.73 0.001 32.032
N of brew eries =1,558; N of beers = 18,044; N of beer-year obseravtl ons =53,031
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Table 3.3
GEE Estimates o f Oppositional Names
Model (3.1) Model (3.2) Model (3.3)
Constant 4.290*** 4.316*** 4.316***
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109)
Density of Beers/1,000 (t-1) -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.059***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Density of Beers2/!.,000,000 (t-1) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pre-1996 Breweries = 1 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Regional Brewery = 1 (t-1) -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Contract Brewery = 1 -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Adjunct Brewery = 1 -0 179*** -0.183*** -0.183***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Acquired Brewery = 1 (t-1) -0.145*** -0.147*** -0.147***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Brewery Cumulati ve Medals Won (U) 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Brewery Time Since First Review (t-1) -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Beer Cumulati ve Reviews/10 (U.) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Beer Name Word Count 0.008*** -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Beer Style: American Lager = 1 -0.532*** -0.530*** -0.518***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Oppositi onal Name = 1 0.160*** 0.166***
(0.011) (0.011)
Oppositi onal Name * American Lager -0.165*
(0.074)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes
N of beers 18,044 18,044 18,044
N of beer-yearobservati ons 53,031 53,031 53,031
Scale parameter 0.170 0.169 0.168
Wald chi-squared 2186.68 2437.7 2482.88
(d.f.) (71) (72) (73)
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; two-tailed tests
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Table 3.4
GEE Estimates o f Oppositional Name Interactions
Model (4.1) Model (4.2) Model (4.3) Model (4.4) Model (4.5)
Constant 4.343*** 4.367*** 4.339*** 4.367*** 4.380***
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109)
Density of Beers/1,000 (t-1) -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.062***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Density of Beers^/l,000,000 (t-1) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
P re-1596 Breweries = 1 0.028*** 0.026** 0.027*** 0.026** 0.026**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Regional Brewery = 1 (t-1) -0.025*** -0.029*** -0.025*** -0.029*** -0.030***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Contract Brewery = 1 -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.062***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Adjunct Brewery = 1 -0.185*** -0.179*** -0.184*** -0.179*** -0.180***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Acquired Brewery = 1 (t-1) -0.160*** -0.152*** -0.161*** -0.154*** -0.163***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Brewery Cumulati ve Medals Won (tt) 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Brewery Time Since First Review (t-1) -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Beer Cumulati ve Reviews/10 (tt.) 0.006*** -0.003* 0.006*** -0.003* -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Beer Name Word Count -0.002 -0.004+ -0.002 -0.004+ -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Beer Style: American Lager = 1 -0.516*** -0.515*** -0.516*** -0.515*** -0.514***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Oppositi onal Name = 1 0.166*** 0.162*** 0.188*** 0.177*** 0.193***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Oppositi onal Name * American Lager -0.163* -0.155* -0.174* -0.164* -0.170*
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Brewery Cumulati ve Beer Count/100 (t-1) 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.021***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Brewery Cumulati ve Review$/1,000 (fl.) 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Oppositi onal Name * Brewery Cum. Beer Count/100 (t-1) -0.044*** -0.042**
(0.013) (0.014)
Oppositi onal Name * Brewery Cum. Reviews/1,000 (t-1) -0.006*** -0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N of beers 18,044 18,044 18,044 18,044 18,044
N of beer-yearobservati ons 53,031 53,031 53,031 53,031 53,031
Scale parameter 0.168 0.167 0.168 0.167 0.167
Wald chi-squared 2491.02 2632.25 2497.88 2638.74 2653.57
(d.f.) (74) (74) (75) (75) (77)
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; two-tailed tests
CHAPTER 4
GROWTH AND SURVIVAL IN THE IVF INDUSTRY8
Introduction
When would firms adopt and benefit from a new technology? For organization 
theorists this general inquiry breaks down to specific questions, three of which seem 
central to the field and which I investigate here: are there firm characteristics that sort out 
organizations into more or less likely to adopt a new technology, how does the extent of 
disruption between the new technology and its predecessors affect its likely adoption and 
benefits, and how does competitive intensity facilitate or retard these likelihoods? All 
three lines of inquiry have been researched extensively in the prior literature, yet 
unanswered questions linger on.
First, in terms of firm characteristics, arguments about inertia and path- 
dependence in adoption propensity are often tied to firm size but research is inconclusive 
as to whether large firms are more or less prone to adopt—both arguments have been 
made and backed up with some empirical validity (Abernathy & Utterback, 1975;
Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Cohen & Klepper, 1996; Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Greve, 2007; 
Haveman, 1993; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1990; King & Tucci, 2002; Scherer & Ross, 
1990; Wade, 1996). Second, it is well established that which firms adopt a new
8 This Chapter is reprinted with the permission of Stanislav Dobrev and Lyda Bigelow
technology and how fast depends on the type of technology—incremental innovations are 
thought to favor large, dominant incumbents while radical, disruptive technologies favor 
agile, fast and responsive firms that are typically small and unencumbered by 
bureaucracy. However, although the distinction between radical and incremental 
technology change features prominently in the technology management literature 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Christensen & Bower, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986), 
research attention has been confined almost exclusively to radical change, perhaps 
because ‘incremental product innovation is often viewed as having relatively little impact 
on differential business performance’ (Banbury & Mitchell, 1995: 162). I seek to 
demonstrate that incremental technology change matters significantly for firm growth and 
survival. Third, in terms of competition, while we know from prior research that 
escalating rivalry drives new technology adoption by encouraging strategic 
differentiation, the focus of investigation has been (often implicitly) confined to adoption 
of radical technology. It remains unclear whether competition also propels peripheral 
change and whether firm size plays a role in the relationship.
Motivated by the inconclusiveness in current research, I investigate the likelihood 
and outcome of incremental technology adoption as a function of both the firm’s internal 
and external context. I make conjectures about an organization’s internal context based 
on its size. In a way, I turn conflicting arguments about large size (whether it promotes or 
retards change) on their head and argue that, in the case of incremental technology, 
midsize firms are both more likely to initiate change and to benefit from it. While 
organizational size is an important predictor capturing a wide range of internal context 
factors like resource munificence and structural complexity, my theory also considers
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size as a positional attribute which places the focal firm in relation to its competitors 
based on proximity on the size gradient. The predictions rest on the strong purported 
disadvantage of midsized firms as developed in both the strategy and the organization 
theory literature.
I develop predictions about the external context of incremental technology 
adoption and tie them to the firm’s competitive environment. The initiative of 
implementing a radical technology typically crowds out the resources for and 
marginalizes the importance of other technology initiatives. To the extent that escalating 
rivalry leads to the adoption of radical technologies (as prior research suggests), it also 
diminishes the risk of nondisruptive technology adoption. Further, I also develop 
arguments tying incremental technology adoption to improved firm performance under 
conditions of intensified competition.
The intended contribution is to provide some theoretical import to the technology 
management literature by using the building blocks of research on change from 
organizational sociology and specifically the core-periphery imagery of change 
(Thompson, 1967; Hannan & Freeman, 1989) which I believe closely parallels notion of 
radical vs incremental technology adoption. In fact, I consider technology adoption as a 
special case of organizational change which allows me to benefit from a vast body of 
prior research focused on reconciling selection and adaptation arguments in theories of 
organizational change. Although the study of peripheral change has also been 
underwhelming within that literature and most developed theory focuses on change in the 
core, I am able to adapt arguments about structural inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) 
and the content-process framework of change (Barnett & Carroll, 1995) to develop
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theory about incremental technology adoption.
The empirical context is the in vitro fertilization industry (IVF) in the U.S. 
between 1989 and 2001. I focus on the specific introduction and adoption of 
intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) technology, which although heralded as a major 
scientific breakthrough at the time of its introduction in 1992 did not require any 
significant internal restructuring or costly resource allocation from the technology 
adopters. Because the observation window spans sufficient time before and after the 
arrival of the ICSI technology, the data are well suited for analyzing the dynamics 
pertinent to my theory. In the next section I develop my theory, research questions and 
hypotheses followed by a brief summary of the IVF industry in which I justify my 
conjecture that ICSI was in fact an incremental, competence-enhancing technology. I 
then describe the data and methods, discuss my findings and conclude by outlining the 
limitations and contributions of this research.
Theory
Adaptation and selection theories offer conflicting predictions about the firm- 
level outcomes of change. In the organizations literature, one prism through which the 
adaptation-selection debate is made tractable is the core-periphery distinction 
(Thompson, 1967) between core organizational structures (those that carry out 
fundamental mission tasks and fulfill technical requirements) and peripheral structures 
(those that mediate between the external context and the protected core, buffering and 
filtering outside influences that threaten internal stability). The core-periphery framework 
was reintroduced to organization theory through Hannan and Freeman’s (1977, 1984,
1989) work on structural inertia—the premise that organizations find it hard to change in 
pace with exogenous transformation. Since these early years of theory development on 
inertia and change, the core-periphery distinction has been indelible from research on 
change, almost to the point of being relegated to a scope condition. Indeed, inertia 
arguments only hold when change affects the organizational core. While the field has 
learned a great deal about how inertia affects both the likelihood and the aftermath of 
core change (for review, see Hannan et al. 2007, Ch 11), existing theory provides scarce 
guidance on how these processes relate to changes in the periphery.
In seeking to account for the relative lack of interest in peripheral and incremental 
change, I surmise that it may be related to another popular theoretical account that 
reconciles selection and adaptation arguments—the content-process model of 
organizational change (Barnett & Carroll, 1995). Every organizational change attempt 
constitutes a de facto transition from one state (broadly defined: market position, resource 
mix, employment model, and the like) to another. Successful adaptation hinges on 
selecting the destination state in a manner that produces a net positive benefit from the 
transition. The process of change is about the costs and disruptions associated with the 
transition itself, regardless of whether it leads to a state that is better or worse for the 
organization. Demonstrating the concurrent operation of adaptive and selective forces 
then requires weighing potentially beneficial content effects with disruptive process 
effects (Dowell & Swaminathan, 2000). Structural inertia theory is essentially about the 
deleterious process effects of change, which result from unintended cascades of change 
occurring in the densely interconnected core structures. By contrast, change in the 




Given that the process effects of change are only likely to be observed in the 
organizational core, it seems natural that researchers attempting to reconcile adaptation 
and selection arguments have strayed from the study of peripheral change. After all, 
comparing process vs. content effects requires focusing on changes in the organizational 
core. As a result, theory about core change has made great strides but we lack systematic 
predictions about peripheral change. My goal is to develop and test such a theory by 
focusing on incremental technology adoption as a special case of peripheral change. The 
limited extant research on peripheral change has claimed that peripheral changes may be 
beneficial if  they improve the organization-environment alignment (Benner & Tushman, 
2003; Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). I build on this broad prediction 
by considering which firms and under what conditions are likely to embark on and 
benefit from peripheral change. My theory explicitly allows for the internal and external 
context of change to play a role. Specifically, I make suppositions about organizational 
size and firm density. Central to these suppositions is the well-established argument of 
the uniquely disadvantaged competitive position of midsize firms.
Organizational Size and Peripheral Change
The first set of hypotheses considers internal organizational processes related to 
size. Existing theory suggests two mechanisms driving the relationship between size and 
change in opposite directions. On the one hand, research on rates of change in 
organizational populations shows that the propensity to initiate transformation generally 
declines with size (Freeman & Soete, 1997; King, Covin, & Hegarty, 2003; Rosen, 1991,
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Scherer & Ross, 1990; Stringer, 2000; Wade, 1996). Researchers who report a negative 
relationship between size and change point to the complex and bureaucratic nature of 
large organizations (Damanpour, 1996; Hitt et al., 1990). Size drives internal complexity 
and with complexity come rigidity and inflexibility, hence the opportunity costs of 
change increase with organizational size. Liability-of-mass arguments also include 
accounts of the changing role of innovation and experimentation in complex large 
companies (Barnett & McKendrick, 2004). Large organizations tend to be more 
differentiated and the proliferation of structure leads to routinization of all activities 
including change and innovation (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Terziovski, 2010).
On the other hand, resource-based accounts of large firms report a positive 
relationship between size and change (Cohen & Klepper, 1996; Delacroix &
Swaminathan, 1991; Jiang, Tan, & Thursby, 2010; King & Tucci, 2002; Wollebaek,
2009). Underpinning this logic is the notion that the negative process effects of change 
can be absorbed by existing slack which large firms are likely to possess. Thus, a firm 
commanding substantial resources can recover from the momentary decline in fitness 
attributed to internal disruptions in the aftermath of reorganization. For example, 
organizational size has been shown to: increase the propensity of new product launches 
(Greve, 2007); increase entry into new market niches (King & Tucci, 2002); and increase 
innovation in emerging fields (Jiang et al., 2010).
Extant research on change not only offers conflicting predictions about size 
effects but it typically models these effects on the outcome and hazard of core change. 
Whether and how organizational size matters for peripheral change is unclear: cosmetic 
changes are much less costly so the resource argument should be muted; at the same time,
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changes in the periphery do not impinge on the technically intertwined core and should 
be less impeded by structural complexity. This suggests that regardless of the direction of 
its effects (positive or negative) organizational size may be less relevant for peripheral 
change. Would the likelihood to implement and benefit from peripheral change vary by 
size?
I think that midsize firms are more likely to engage in peripheral change based on 
an interpretation of size as a positional attribute, namely, the location of the focal firm in 
the organizational size distribution within the industry. Two theories about liability of 
middle size guide my conjectures.
The theory of size-localized competition (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1989; Baum 
& Mezias, 1992) posits that organizations compete most intensely with other similar-size 
organizations; that is, competitive intensity increases with crowding in location on the 
size gradient. The disadvantage of midsized organizations is that they face competition 
on both ends and thus operate in tightly packed regions of the size dimension. The second 
theory, that of resource partitioning (Carroll, 1985; Carroll, Dobrev, & Swaminathan, 
2002), is premised on a distinction between generalist and specialist organizations. 
Generalists compete on scale while specialists differentiate by customization and stronger 
appeal, which is often underpinned by a collective identity or an overarching sense of 
authenticity (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000). As scale competition unfolds, the selection 
pressures faced by each generalist are a function of the cumulative size difference 
between that firm and its bigger rivals. So small-scale competitors (or midsize firms that 
are bigger than specialists but smaller than dominant large scale generalists) neither 
benefit from the appeal of craft production and customization nor can match the big mass
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producers on scale; midsize firms thus occupy the most precarious competitive position.
With the positional disadvantage of midsize firms well established, I surmise that 
these firms have a higher likelihood of initiating peripheral change. Mid-size 
organizations have a stronger incentive to embark on changes in the periphery simply 
because their unenviable strategic position forces them to operate in a continuously 
reactive mode, seeking to deploy any source of potential differentiation that may provide 
at least temporary competitive relief. Against the scale advantage of their bigger rivals 
and against the specialization advantage of their smaller rivals, midsize firms are likely to 
experiment with any opportunity to get ‘unstuck’ from the middle. One way to 
accomplish this is by attempting to differentiate on a competitive dimension unrelated to 
size where the order of firms on the size gradient can be reshuffled thus allowing midsize 
firms to establish a favorable position.
Being subjected to intense competition drains resources and curtails the ability to 
invest in significant core reorganization (e.g., pursue a radically new technology). Hence, 
the choice of strategic options for midsize firms may be limited to cosmetic, speculative 
changes. Due to limited alternatives midsize firms have stronger incentives than large and 
small firms to pursue peripheral changes. Within the in vitro industry, the low cost of 
adopting the ICSI technology seems particularly appealing for midsize firms. ICSI 
utilizes existing laboratory equipment and requires only minimal levels of training for lab 
technicians. Studies in the economics of assisted reproductive technology (Hamilton & 
McManus, 2005) concur that the organizational costs of acquiring the necessary 
resources are modest, as are the costs to the patient. For example, a cycle of IVF costs on 
average $10,000-$15,000, and medications cost approximately $3,000-$5,000, whereas
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most clinics charge about $1,500 for ICSI. Lacking the financial resources or 
capabilities to make more substantial investments in infrastructure or technology, midsize 
firms will likely be drawn to adopting ICSI.
• H1a: A clinic’s hazard of ICSI adoption is a non-monotonic function of 
size, reversing from positive to negative.
I also contend that midsize firms are more likely to benefit from peripheral 
transformation than small or large firms. To develop this prediction I first consider the 
purported benefits of peripheral change. Relevant arguments emphasize relatively low- 
cost and low probability of disrupting the core while improving external alignment 
(McKendrick & Wade, 2010). Viewed through the lens of most recent theorizing, the 
disruptions associated with core change stem from the high extent of relatedness among 
structural components in the core. For example, changing the mission of the organization 
would likely impact its principal technology, marketing strategy, and human capital 
requirements. Disruptions arise because core change generates cascading effects which 
are difficult to anticipate and prepare for by organizational leaders (Hannan, Polos, & 
Carroll, 2003). By contrast, peripheral transformation can be helpful in seeking to present 
the organization in a favorable light, particularly when environmental change demands 
organizational realignment. Although peripheral change may not necessarily prove 
beneficial, it is also unlikely to produce deleterious consequences. Past research has 
demonstrated that peripheral change does not negatively affect organizational fitness 
although support for its beneficial effects has been inconclusive. Delacriox and 
Swaminathan (1991) found that cosmetic and speculative changes did not affect wineries’ 
survival chances, and Dobrev (1999) reported that product design changes in titles and 
format appearance of communist newspapers neither helped nor harmed their failure
hazards during the post-socialist transition.
The inconclusiveness of the prior studies may be explained if I consider the 
outcome of peripheral change, at least partly, as a function of organizational size. Given 
the severity of their competitive disadvantage, midsize firms are more likely to extract at 
least some benefit from peripheral change. For example, an organization can choose to 
aggressively market a fairly incremental, even meaningless improvement in its 
operations, especially when other sources of differentiation are few and far between. 
Because midsize firms are closer to failure than their bigger and smaller rivals, any 
potential performance benefit, however small, is likely to be magnified in comparative 
relief. Because of their unenviable starting position, midsize firms have lower 
opportunity costs (i.e., less ‘at stake’) associated with peripheral change and are thus 
more likely to benefit from it.
At the time of its introduction, ICSI was heralded by some professionals as one of 
the most important technology advances in assisted reproductive technology since the 
advent of in vitro fertilization in the late 1970s (Schoolcraft, 1999). However, in the 
ensuing years ICSI would turn out to be a clear example of a peripheral, albeit popular, 
technology based on a number of determining criteria. For example, ICSI functions as 
competence-enhancing technology which not only did not threaten to displace an existing 
technology but is not a stand-alone technology and can only be used in conjunction with 
existing in vitro procedures and technologies. The initial fanfare surrounding the 
technology might have been a marketing ploy but an effective one nevertheless: while 
ICSI eventually failed to improve success rates, ICSI adoption both within and across the 
clinics in this industry grew rapidly since its introduction in 1992. In a premium service
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industry claiming to utilize the height of medical innovation, not adopting a technology, 
be it marginal, risks being misconstrued as a technological laggard— a worry particularly 
resonant with midsize clinics squeezed between small providers offering convenience and 
local access and large players boasting the reputations of their nationally renowned 
medical experts.
• H1b: The growth rate o f clinics adopting ICSI is a non-monotonic 
function o f size reversing from positive to negative.
• H1c: The hazard o f failure for clinics adopting ICSI is a non-monotonic 
function o f size reversing from negative to positive.
Organizational Density and Peripheral Change 
My second set of hypotheses examines how one facet of organizations’ external 
context—the proliferation of other similar organizations (i.e., population density)— 
affects the likelihood and outcome of peripheral change. The idea that similarity in 
resource dependence breeds commensalism dates back to the origin of human ecology 
(Park, 1936; Hawley, 1956). Commensalism underscores the duality in a competitive 
relationship in which relevant actors at once compete for and protect the shared resource 
from external threats. The greater the number of homophilous actors, the more intense the 
rivalry for that resource is and the greater the need to grow and protect it becomes. 
Population density has been shown to drive up competition in numerous prior studies 
(Dobrev & Kim, 2006). Research in this direction has shown that increasing density not 
only has a direct positive effect on organizational failure but also has a second-order 
effect by way of instigating core transformation which itself often leads to disbanding 
(Dobrev, Kim, & Hannan, 2001; Khessina, 2010). Competition prompts firms to seek
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alternate market positions or pursue other forms of nontrivial strategic response that 
typically involve core change (Greve, 1995; King & Tucci, 2002). Such attempts at 
significantly altering the firm’s strategic model triggers inertia, which in turn elevate 
failure hazards. As competitive pressures rise, firms become more likely to engage in 
core transformation and thus are more likely to fail.
I conjecture that while intensifying competition increases the risk of core change, 
it simultaneously diminishes the propensity for peripheral change for two reasons. First, 
as a matter of resource constraints, any slack assets at the organization’s disposal are 
likely mobilized in support of core change leaving little support for additional change 
efforts. Nonessential projects get crowded out and the human and capital resources they 
command are redeployed in support of core change. Second, the organizational functions 
embedded in peripheral structures are geared by design to complement those in the 
central core and to seek to align them with external requisites. Regardless of whether a 
firm actually embarks on core change or not, as long as core change is being considered 
as a strategic option, the likelihood of peripheral change should decrease.9 Anticipating a 
change in core features makes external alignment either ephemeral (if the core features to 
be aligned are not yet known) or potentially obsolete (if current core features are not 
expected to be retained).
In the IVF industry competitors can monitor one another fairly closely. Because
9 This condition is important because its empirical implication is that the occurrence of 
peripheral change is not only less likely than that of core change but that peripheral 
change is also less likely than not embarking on any change. Even if firms contemplate 
core change as rivalry increases, they may not necessarily resort to it. Yet as long as the 
option of core change is under consideration, it deters the occurrence of peripheral 
change. Accordingly, H2a is tested against the null of no effect of density on peripheral 
change.
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the U.S. mandates that firms report information on the type and frequency of procedures 
and technologies deployed, firms may be more likely to respond to competitors by adding 
a core technology simply because of the unusually high level of information on 
competitors which exists in this industry. Related to this issue of competitive 
transparency, firms (and their customers) also have access to success rates for each firm. 
The interviews with industry participants made it clear that physicians are keenly aware 
of the potential impact of technologies on success rates. For some clinics, e.g., the larger 
teaching hospital-based clinics, scientific proof of effectiveness is a prerequisite for 
adoption of a new technology. Still, all physicians I spoke to indicated that they are 
cognizant of the comparison of outcomes. While they may tailor their approach to their 
competitors differently in terms of treatment philosophy, patient care, and drug regimens, 
there is a consensus on matching core technologies.
In contrast, given a highly competitive environment, the degree to which these 
same mechanisms of monitoring and matching competitors are at play for peripheral 
technologies is less clear. Indeed, within the in vitro industry, the high cost of medical 
equipment, technological innovation and even ancillary needs such as malpractice 
insurance suggests that during periods of increased competition, clinics will likely be 
focusing resources on either current technologies or, future technologies that have the 
ability to significantly impact the competitive position of the clinic. As a result, the 
adoption of ICSI during these periods would appear to be a strategic course of action that 
is neither necessary, nor particularly pressing.
• H2a: A clinic’s hazard of ICSI adoption is a negative function of the 
number of clinics.
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I argued that peripheral change is less likely to be implemented when rising 
density intensifies market competition. I also conjecture that density affects the returns to 
peripheral change. My starting point again is the strong empirical base in support of 
inertia theory, namely that core change leads to a cascading effect, and increases in 
failure (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Hannan, Polos & Carroll, 2003). Although a change in 
the right direction in response to rising competition may produce some performance 
benefits, these benefits are often offset by the high cost of structural disruptions (Hannan 
et al., 2006). If the decisive criterion for the successful outcome of change is to minimize 
disruptions, then peripheral change (which does not impinge on the core) ought to be 
more beneficial. So the overall outcome of peripheral change may be superior to that of 
core change even if the latter is more likely to occur as competition intensifies. The 
relevant question then becomes whether peripheral change is a more viable alternative for 
the firm than simply staying the course and avoiding any change.
I think that peripheral change is desirable when the firm’s position is challenged 
because it affords the opportunity to signal a dynamic response to competition with little 
downside potential. Although substantively, the firm may undergo little or no change in 
its de facto strategic resources and capabilities, the signaling value of peripheral change 
alone may prove a prized, albeit transitive, tactic against aggressive rivals. By definition, 
peripheral change cannot meaningfully alter a firm’s strategic direction and only core 
change may potentially provide a change in the right direction. Yet, the cost of 
implementing core change may more than offset its benefits thus making peripheral 
change a more viable course of action.
While this conjecture seems reasonable under any external conditions, the relative
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benefits of peripheral change seem to rise proportionately with rising competition. First, 
as rivalry stiffens, the implementation costs of core change inevitably rise as the number 
of rivals to be outmaneuvered increases; in relative terms (compared with core change) 
this makes peripheral change more appealing. Second, doing nothing in response to 
increasing competition displeases stakeholders and signals tardiness, unresponsiveness 
and incompetence. External and internal constituents demand some reaction to 
competitors’ inroads if only to assuage fears of misdirection and lack of leadership; in 
relative terms (compared with a no-change, ‘stay the course’ strategy), peripheral change 
becomes more effective as rivalry intensifies.
Within the in vitro industry, a unique feature of the evolution of the industry may 
help explain why clinics could ostensibly benefit from peripheral technology adoption, 
even in times of heightened competition. As mentioned above, while the advent of ICSI 
was initially trumpeted as a radical technological innovation, it clearly did not prove to be 
one. Wishful thinking may have been a deliberate strategy in an industry where major 
technological breakthroughs have been decidedly missing since the advent of two new 
core technologies (gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT) and zygote intrafallopian 
transfer (ZIFT)) in the mid-1980s. Moreover, these two technologies have steadily 
declined in their use over time and by 2001, less than 2% of all assisted reproductive 
procedures utilized either GIFT or ZIFT, with more than 98% representing procedures 
done with the original IVF technology. As a result, clinics’ ability to differentiate through 
technology was practically nonexistent. What clinics saw in ICSI was an opportunity to 
make a claim (however inherently fictitious) for technological leadership and 
commitment to innovation otherwise unavailable to them. Thus, although heightened
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competition rationally pushes either towards substantive differentiation on a 
nontechnology dimension (i.e., not changing a clinic’s technology profile), or towards 
major technological change in the core (e.g., diversification into related medical services 
beyond assisted reproduction), the payoff to a well-thought out marketing effort (however 
speculative) around ICSI adoption that eliminates the perception of a technology laggard 
or the cost of learning fundamentally different technologies seems clear.
• H2b: The growth rate o f ICSI adopting clinics is a positive 
function o f the number o f clinics.
• H2c: The hazard o f failure o f ICSI-adopting clinics is a negative 
function o f the number o f clinics.
Empirical Setting: The IVF Industry 
Overview . The in vitro fertilization (IVF) industry was launched with the birth of 
the world’s first ‘test-tube’ baby in 1978 in the UK. Within three years, the first IVF 
clinic was founded in the U.S. and the industry has grown rapidly over the years. IVF 
refers to a three-step process in which eggs are retrieved from the patient, the eggs are 
fertilized with sperm in a lab, and finally, the resulting embryos are transferred back to 
the uterus. Over time, additional assisted reproduction technologies (ART) have 
emerged, although IVF remains the dominant technology. Initially, IVF success rates 
were relatively low. In 1984 there were 40 IVF live births. By 2009 there were 146,244 
reported ART cycles performed, resulting in 45,870 live births. The industry has 
undergone tremendous growth, with density increasing from 175 clinics in 1989, the first 
year of observation, to 381 clinics in 2001, the final year of observation. Despite the fact
that the cost of treatment for infertility is largely paid directly out-of pocket by patients 
and not covered through insurance, the number of treatment cycles (retrievals) grew from 
34,095 in 1989 to 537,439 by 2001.
Intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), was first utilized in a research lab in the 
U.S. in 1991, and became available to patients in 1992 (Devroey and Van Steirteghem, 
2004). The new technology involves directly injecting a single sperm into an egg using 
microscopic needles and pipettes. Although developed in order to treat male-factor 
infertility cases, it was soon considered a possible candidate to improve outcomes for all 
infertility patients. Only after several years of analyzing outcomes as well as the unique 
chromosomal risks associated with ICSI, did it become clear that the technology could 
not deliver on its initial promise. Nevertheless, ICSI quickly diffused throughout the 
industry and by the end of the observation period was offered by the vast majority of 
clinics.
Technology, competition and theoretical relevance. My theory accords well 
with the dynamics of competition and technology adoption in the IVF industry. In most 
major metropolitan areas, the largest firms are embedded within teaching hospitals and 
the smallest firms are often comprised of only one or two physicians. In informational 
interviews with reproductive endocrinologists in two cities, I found anecdotal evidence 
that the smallest and largest clinics approach technology adoption differently than 
midsized firms. This seems to be due to differences in philosophy in weighing scientific 
evidence as well as concerns about managing patient demand. Physicians at a large 
teaching hospital based clinic indicated that they were interested in only adopting proven 
technologies. For example, they were not interested in adopting a new drug protocol that
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a midsized clinic was offering due to the lack of scientific studies supporting claims of 
improvement in patient outcomes. A physician associated with a small, but thriving 
practice in the same city explained that none of his patients had requested this new drug 
protocol, thus he had not adopted it. Both the large and small clinics did not express 
concerns about attracting new patients. If anything, the opposite concern was expressed. 
For both the large and small clinics, the physicians I interviewed indicated that they were 
operating at capacity. They indicated the challenges they faced in supporting their current 
patient loads. On the other hand, the midsized clinic was clearly concerned with 
maintaining a flow of patients and one of the physicians couched the adoption of the 
unproven drug protocol as potentially beneficial. This physician described his groups as 
being willing and able to try unconventional treatments in order to satisfy and attract 
patients.
In the context of the IVF industry, adopting ICSI does not meaningfully impact on 
the established competencies and routinized work flow inside the firm. Since multiple 
eggs are collected for each cycle of treatment, even if ICSI does not improve outcomes, it 
is unlikely to worsen them because implementing the technology only requires a single 
egg. Further, there is minimal disruption in terms of the workflow and scheduling of 
procedures. ICSI is simply done in conjunction with the final steps used once gametes 
have been collected. The skills and equipment needed to adopt ICSI are highly-related to 
the lab skills already in use in established technologies. There is nevertheless a clear 
potential marketing benefit to offering ICSI. Fertility treatment is fraught with 
uncertainty even under the best circumstances and patients are often willing to do 
whatever possible to improve their odds of success. Physicians have wide discretion in
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adopting ICSI and may concede to anxious patients’ requests for it, even in the absence 
of justifiable medical imperatives. ICSI can also be used to signal to customers the 
strength of the firm’s lab capabilities, capabilities that are also necessary for utilizing 
established primary technologies. The adoption of ICSI can be useful in attracting new 
patients by simply reflecting an image of technological competence.
Data and Methods
Data. The data on the IVF industry span the period 1989-2001 and come from the 
Annual National Summary and Fertility Clinic Reports. These reports were initially 
administered by the Society for Artificial Reproductive Technologies (SART) and were 
voluntary. The passage of the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act o f 1992 
mandated that organizations performing IVF services provide detailed annual data for all 
procedures performed to the CDC.10 In reality, the transition from SART to CDC did not 
take effect until 1995 so my data from 1989 to 1994 are based on the SART-administered 
surveys and on the CDC surveys from 1995 to 2001. Although SART began 
administering the surveys in 1987, it was not until 1989 when they issued a voluntary 
mandate for reporting that produced much more reliable and comprehensive data. 
Moreover, the nature of the data collected changed in 1989 and remained consistent with 
the CDC data thus allowing us to combine the two data sources and reconstruct the life- 
history of each clinic from 1989 to 2001. Even after 1989 individual firms did 
occasionally fail or delay to report in a given year but I was eventually able to update the 
missing yearly records. While every survey is subject to self-reporting bias, one
10 www.cdc.gov/art/ARTReports.htm
mitigating factor increasing the validity of the information reported by the clinics is the 
practice by the CDC to perform random site visits conducted on a yearly basis. For 
example, 29 of the 374 clinics reporting in 1999 were subject to on-site visits.
The reports filed by the individual clinics contain various performance and 
operational data including the type of ART procedure used (IVF, GIFT, ZIFT and ICSI) 
and the number of successful retrievals, pregnancies and live births resulting from each 
procedure. Further, the success rate is broken down by patient age and type of cycle 
(fresh vs. frozen embryo and donor vs. nondonor eggs). I constructed the dataset in a 
year-clinic format, updating the technology profile for each clinic by creating indicator 
variables for each technology. Of special interest to the analysis is whether a clinic is 
employing the ICSI technology so I include a dummy variable, ICSI. To measure ICSI 
adoption I marked up the first year in which a firm reported the use of the technology. I 
do not know the founding dates of clinics that entered prior to 1989 so unfortunately I do 
not have data to compute organizational age. I used the following rule to determine the 
year of clinic closing (failure): if  a clinic failed to report a survey for a given year but did 
so the following year, I assumed that it continued to exist and used the available data to 
interpolate missing values on the covariates of interest by using the average value of the 
preceding and the subsequent yearly records. If a clinic failed to report data for two 
consecutive years, I did not feel confident interpolating missing data or assuming that the 
clinic continued to operate. Instead, I reasoned that the clinic must have shut down 
temporarily and then restarted operations again. So I did not treat cases of temporarily 
ceased operations as failures, unless of course, the clinic never reentered the industry.
Consistent with earlier studies I sought to measure organizational size as scale of
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operations. While the data provide information on live pregnancies and births, I thought 
that the best measure of size is the count of annual retrievals performed in each clinic. 
Live pregnancies and births are obviously not accomplished with every patient and thus 
would bias the size measure, as in the case of a smaller clinic with a higher success rate. 
By contrast, a retrieval represents a treatment cycle that has been successful at getting the 
patient to the point of being capable of undergoing an assisted reproductive treatment via 
one of the available technologies (IVF, GIFT, ZIFT, ICSI). Although a successful 
retrieval does not guarantee a pregnancy, it does reflect the deployment of a key 
technology by the clinic and as such, in my view, is the most appropriate measure of 
‘scale’ in the industry. I use both a linear and a squared function of this variable to test 
the predicted non-monotonic effects of size on adoption, growth, and failure. To control 
for the possible difference between content and process effects of organizational change I 
computed a clock variable, time since ICSI, which counts years since ICSI adoption for 
each firm. I also computed two measures that capture the effect of industry experience 
with the new technology: cumulative ICSI adoptions counts the number of clinics that 
have adopted the technology since its introduction in 1992 while annual ICSI adoptions 
counts the number of adoptions in the preceding calendar year. As usual, organizational 
proliferation is measured by annual density o f clinics, or the number of clinics in 
existence each year. I complete the industry-level set of covariates by macroeconomic 
controls for Inflation and GDP.
Methods. I use event history analysis to model the rates of failure and peripheral 
(ICSI) technology adoption among IVF clinics. For the failure rate models, each clinic is 
at risk of failure in each of the years in which it is in operation, based on my data sources.
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I assume that failure occurs at the end of the year in which the clinic files its last annual 
report or, in a few cases, it cedes to report for at least two consecutive years (as explained 
above). I do not know what happens to clinics at the end of 2001, the last year of the 
observation window so these records are uninformatively right-censored. It has become 
convention to use organizational age as the time-clock in event history analysis, a 
practice that allows researchers to model age-dependence in many of the observed effects 
of other covariates. Unfortunately, as I acknowledged above, I do not have reliable data 
on organizational age so I use calendar time instead. I experimented with several 
functional specifications and determined that an exponential model fits best. Allowing the 
rate to vary across calendar time does not produce any substantive results, and interferes 
with many of the industry-level effects so I constrain the rate to be constant across the 
observation period. The risk-set in the failure hazard models consists of 3,770 clinic-year 
spells for 562 clinics, 140 of which failed.
For the technology adoption models, only firms that have not yet adopted the ICSI 
technology are at risk, that is, I treat adoption as a nonrepeatable event and drop the clinic 
from the dataset in the year following ICSI adoption. Again, I assume that an adoption 
event occurs at the very end of the year preceding the one in which the firm first reported 
implementing ICSI. Of course, a clinic cannot become at risk of adopting the technology 
prior to (the turn of) 1992 when ICSI was first introduced, hence, I also eliminate the pre- 
1991 records for all firms. As with the failure hazard models, I right-censor records of 
nonadopters in the last observation year and use calendar time as the time-clock for the 
same reasons explained above. The number of clinic-year observations in the adoption 
risk-set comprises 885 clinic-year spells representing 300 firms of which 249 adopted
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ICSI.
I model growth rates by regressing a clinic’s number of retrievals in a given year 
on number of retrievals and other observables in the previous year. This completely 
eliminates all clinic records in the last observation year of the data because I cannot 
estimate growth rates without knowing the value of retrievals in the subsequent year. It 
also eliminates firms with single-year observations. As a result, the number of records in 
the data file I use for the growth rate models is 3,207, representative of 498 clinics. I used 
the method of generalized estimating equations (GEE) which allowed us to model 
variance both between clinics and across time for each clinic. The data are structured as 
an unbalanced panel with multiple observations of different length for each clinic. The 
different clinic-year records for each clinic are likely autocorrelated because of 
permanent but unobserved firm-level characteristics. To control for such serial 
correlation between the records for each clinic, I used the exchangeable correlation 
matrix, as implemented in STATA.
Results
The inferential statistics are presented in Tables 4.1-4.3. I begin with the adoption 
models in Table 4.1. Model 2.1 is a baseline which shows positive rate dependence in 
ICSI adoption and negative time dependence across industry age. I test the prediction that 
the firm size effect is non-monotonic (H1a) and confirm that the adoption rate initially 
increases with size but then the effect reverses direction across high counts of the 
variable. In model 2.3 I test hypothesis H2a which predicts that as competitive crowding 
increases, ICSI adoption will decrease. The significant negative coefficient of density
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confirms the prediction.
I next turn to the survival analysis presented in Table 4.2. The baseline model 3.1 
suggests that there is monotonic negative size-dependence in the failure rate, consistent 
with numerous earlier findings. My prediction that the benefit to adopting an incremental 
technology will be non-monotonic across size (H1b) is tested in model 3.2 and is not 
confirmed. Adopting ICSI provides no survival advantage to any firm regardless of its 
size. Including the nonmonotonic specification testing the relationship between size and 
incremental technology (i.e., the interactions between number of retrievals and ICSI 
adoption) does not improve model fit significantly so I exclude it from the next model. 
That model, 3.3, tests H2b which predicts that ICSI adoption may be beneficial under 
conditions of rising competitive intensity. In support, the interaction coefficient between 
ICSI and density is negative and significant suggesting that the failure hazard of firms 
adopting ICSI improves as the number of their peers increases.
Finally, I present the results of the firm growth analysis in Table 4.3. The baseline 
model 4.1 suggests that growth rates are non-monotonic across size with midsize firms 
growing the fastest. Model 4.2 demonstrates that this pattern only holds among ICSI- 
adopting firms— a finding which confirms hypothesis H1c. Including the interactions 
between number of retrievals and ICSI adoption amplifies size-dependence in growth 
rates, which becomes positive and monotonic but non-proportionate, so growth rates are 
disproportionately higher for large firms. The next model, 4.3, tests hypothesis H2c 
which suggests that ICSI adoption provides a growth boost to firms as competitive 
intensity rises. The positive and significant coefficient for the interaction between density 
and ICSI adoption confirms this prediction.
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With five of the six hypotheses confirmed, I next turn to summarizing the 
theoretical contribution of the research and tying it in with the broader research stream on 
technology management and organizational change.
Discussion
The theory of peripheral change as a function of, at least partly, organizational 
size and population density that I developed was largely supported by my findings. Using 
incremental technology adoption in the IVF industry as the empirical context, I showed 
that midsize firms are more likely than small and large firms to resort to peripheral 
change. I explained this variation by size with the limited choice-set of strategic options 
available to midsize firms faced with strong selection pressures emanating from their 
unenviable market positions. I also predicted that midsize firms will benefit from 
peripheral change more than small and large firms because the value of a peripheral 
adjustment hinges on the incentive and susceptibility of the firm to appropriate that value. 
Firms under strong selection pressures will resort to any tactic to seek competitive relief. 
As such, midsize firms are unlikely to improve competitive positions by catching up 
volume with large competitors; and they find it hard to respond to small, specialized 
rivals by customizing their offerings because doing so would violate their scale 
economies. Seeking to differentiate by adopting a new technology, even when it 
represents little more than a process improvement, is an opportunity to play up a 
marketing strategy of technological leadership. Strategically, the goal is to detract from 
the perception of being a laggard in terms of scale and actual R&D capability or customer 
responsiveness.
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By contrast, dominant market players renowned for their technical expertise 
would find it hard to impress constituents by pursuing cosmetic improvements. Small 
rivals, whose customer base is local, both geographically and in terms of relationship 
management with their clientele (e.g., word of mouth advertising, personal reputations, 
community engagement, etc.) are unlikely to see substantial business growth by adopting 
a non-impactful technology. My results partly support this logic as I find that growth 
rates for incremental technology adopters vary significantly by size, and that midsize 
firms have higher growth rates. Although I do not find support for the prediction that 
these firms will also directly benefit from peripheral change in terms of improved 
survival chances, it is clear that they do so indirectly, by way of higher growth. I concur 
with the practitioner view that ‘...in  any business, if  you’re not growing, you’re dying.’11
The findings also offer strong support for the predictions that variation in 
population density plays an important role in incremental technology adoption and its 
outcome. Building on the premise of density-dependence theory, I conjectured that if 
density drives competition and if intensified competition makes core change more likely, 
this will simultaneously decrease the likelihood of peripheral change. When market 
positions become tightly contested, organizations seek to either profoundly restructure 
operations and reformulate strategies, or commit fully to executing current strategies. 
Either option requires full deployment of resources leaving little room for piecemeal 
adaptations. Accordingly, I found that as the number of IVF clinics increases, adoption of 
the ICSI technology wanes.
Yet based on my results, this may not be the optimal strategy. I know from extant
11 David B. Ingram quoted in ‘Diverse Offering,’ Vanderbilt Business online edition, 
Spring 2010.
research that core change frequently leads to failure and that firms that do not change are 
also at risk of being de-selected. I argued and provided evidence that under stiffening 
competition, the payoff to peripheral change increases. Rather than succumb to the 
hazard of structural misalignment in the core or risk the perils of inertial stasis, firms that 
retain their core intact yet engage in incremental changes geared to impress external 
constituents with their strategic flexibility and the swift response of their management, do 
better. As my findings demonstrated, incremental technology adopters experienced 
improved survival chances and higher growth rates with rising population density.
The data are good but not perfect. I offered an ad hoc definition of peripheral 
change—the definition of ICSI as an incremental technology was only idiosyncratically 
validated in the context of the IVF industry. While I am certain in the internal validity of 
my measure, perhaps the greatest improvement future research in this direction could 
make is to develop a more generalizable measure of peripheral change. Moreover, the 
measure is dichotomous and does not allow us to compare the impact of the covariates on 
core as well as on peripheral change. Either a continuous measure where variance in the 
extent of change is observed or two complementary dichotomous measures indicating the 
occurrence of core and peripheral change would help to establish the robustness and 
further generalizability of my theory and findings.
Conclusion
I hope to have made some progress towards building an answer to the question 
which I began with: when would firms adopt and benefit from a new technology. 
Addressing only a piece of the puzzle, I deliberately limited myself to investigating the
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adoption of an incremental, competence-enhancing technology partly because so much of 
the research in technology management centers on the study of radical innovation. My 
contribution to this research stream is to demonstrate the value of taking an ecological 
approach to the study of technological change. As it relates to technological change and 
innovation, the core-periphery distinction in organizational ecology is akin to the 
difference between disruptive and incremental technology adoption in the technology and 
innovation literature (e.g., Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Christensen, 1998). In this 
literature, the primary research focus has been on radical innovation with ideas about 
incremental technology adoption discussed indirectly as a competence-enhancing means 
of solidifying the position of industry leading firms (Sosa, 2009, 2011; Tripsas, 2011). 
Even here, the categorization of the type of technological innovation is complex and 
often ambiguous (Gatignon et al., 2002). I aimed to clarify what is meant by an 
incremental innovation by relying on the logic of the organizational core-periphery 
distinction, and in doing so I demonstrated the usefulness of this approach to those 
studying incremental change in the broader technology management area.
The contribution to organizational ecology was to develop and test theory about 
peripheral change which has been largely overlooked in prior studies. I developed the 
unconfirmed speculations from prior studies about the potential benefits of peripheral 
change into systematic predictions specifying under what conditions and for which 
organizations these benefits may accrue. While peripheral change is in fact speculative 
and cosmetic, it is still theoretically important in that it complements and hopefully 
improves our understanding of core change. For example, the relationship between size 
and change which has been left unresolved in prior research may be due to the fact that
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arguments about resource endowments and bureaucratic complexity only apply to the 
study of core change. As I argued, peripheral adjustments do not require significant 
resources and do not impinge on the structurally complex organizational core. Instead, 
my predictions about the relationship between size and peripheral change are largely 
behavioral, based on a theoretically informed interpretation of the competitive 
disadvantage faced by midsize organizations.
I also reckon that my focus on midsize organizations will resonate with a large 
audience in the organization and management research community since size is perhaps 
the most powerful and ubiquitous explanatory covariate in organizational analysis of 
various kinds. Most contemporary theories in organizational sociology and strategic 
management contain predictions about the unenviable position of midsize organizations. 
In Porter’s (1980) influential framework, firms that are unable to deploy a cost-leadership 
or a product-differentiation strategy are viewed as ‘stuck in the middle.’ In ecological 
theories of size-localized competition and resource partitioning, firms that sit in the 
middle of the size distribution are thought to be neither big enough to compete on par 
with large-scale rivals, nor small enough to legitimately offer craft based or customized 
products. Yet, despite the agreed upon severity of competitive pressures faced by 
midsized firms, their existence is a fact. Even in evolving industries where consolidation 
eventually produces a bimodal size distribution, midsize firms do not disappear 
overnight. Under some political and macroeconomic regimes, as with Germany’s class of 
Mittelstand companies, they may even thrive and dominate their respective industries. 
While much prior research across a wide range of disciplinary and applied theoretical 
perspectives has focused on what drives the demise of middle-sized organizations, here I
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considered what may at least partly alleviate the strong selection pressures to which they 
are subjected. The central finding was that midsize firms are more likely to resort to 
peripheral change and more likely to benefit from it.
Finally, I hope the results help to dispel some existing theoretical misconceptions 
and forge further integration within the field. A pervasive yet inaccurate interpretation of 
organizational ecology research, especially with respect to the theory of structural inertia, 
has been that it is somehow ‘anti-managerial.’ Because inertia theory predicts that 
organizations that change will fail (due to destabilizing the very structures that provide 
the organizational capacity to act with reliability and accountability) and those that do not 
change will also fail (because inability to keep up with external change will simply lead 
them to be replaced by firms with better external fit), it is assumed that there is not much 
managers can do to avoid a gloomy outcome in the face of external shifts: whether the 
firm changes or not, the hazard of failure increases. Using the toolkit of organizational 
ecology, I reiterated that these predictions only apply to core change. Embarking on 
peripheral change under conditions of intensifying competition improves survival 
chances and growth, hence—in full accord with inertia theory—it provides a desirable 
course of action, clearly within the realm of managerial discretion. Let further integration 
proceed.
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ML Estimates of Size and Density Effects on Technology Adoption
Table 4.1
Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3
Industry Age -2.70* (1.33) -4.27** (1.35) -1.45 (1.75)
Inflation -0.02 (0.20) -0.01 (0.20) -0.42 (0.25)
GDP Billions (x10 -2 ) 0.02 (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.12** (0.03)
ICSI adoptions at t-1 0.01* (0.01) 0.01* (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Retrievals (x 10 '2 ) 0.51** (0.10) 0.51** (0.10)
Retrievals 2 (x 10 _1 ) -0.28* (0.12) -0.28* (0.12)
Density of clinics -0.03** (0.01)
Log-likelihood (d.f.) -553.62 (4) -533.26 (6) -529.20 (7)
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
Number of spells:885; Number of clinics: 300; Number of events: 249. 
* significant at .05, ** significant at .01.
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Table 4.2
ML Estimates of Size and Density Effects on Failure Rates
Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3
Industry Age 9.35* (4.28) 9.74* (4.30) 11.62** (4.36)
Inflation -0.74** (0.24) -0.73** (0.24) -0.68** (0.24)
GDP Billions (x10 -2 ) -0.09 (0.05) -0.09 (0.05) -0.11* (0.05)
ICSI adoptions at t-1 0.002 (0.01) 0.002 (0.01) 0.001 (0.01)
Density of clinics -0.04 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) -0.05* (0.03)
Density of clinics 2 (x10 '3 ) 0.07 (0.06) 0.08 (0.06) 0.12* (0.06)
ICSI 0.18 (0.27) -0.12 (0.34) 3.61** (1.28)
Years since ICSI Adoption -0.09 (0.07) -0.10 (0.07) -0.06 (0.07)
Retrievals (x 10 -2 ) -0.30* (0.15) -0.64* (0.29) -0.27** (0.10)
Retrievals 2 (x 10 -1 ) 0.08 (0.18) 0.44 (0.44)
Retrievals (x10 -2 ) xICSI 0.49 (0.36)
Retrievals 2 (x 10 -1 ) x ICSI -0.50 (0.55)
Density of clinics ICSI -0.01** (0.01)
Log-likelihood (d.f.) 5 70 5 O) 40 -565 5
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
Number of spells:3770; Number of firms: 562; Number of events: 140. 
* significant at .05, ** significant at .01.
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GEE Estimates of Size and Density Effects on Growth Rates
Table 4.3
Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3
Constant -1.62** (0.50) -1.41** (0.50) -1.70** (0.52)
Inflation 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
GDP Billions (x10 -2 ) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
ICSI adoptions at t-1 -0.003* (0.00) -0.001* (0.00) -0.003* (0.00)
Density of clinics 0.01** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00)
Density of clinics 2 (x10 -3 ) -0.02** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01)
ICSI 0.04 (0.03) -0.06 (0.04) -0.45* (0.18)
Years since ICSI Adoption -0.02 (0.01) -0.02* (0.01) -0.02* (0.01)
Retrievals (x 10 -2 ) 1.04** (0.03) 0.85** (0.03) 0.85** (0.03)
Retrievals 2 (x 10 -1 ) -0.04** (0.02) 0.33** (0.08) 0.34** (0.08)
Retrievals (x10 -2 ) xICSI 0.19** (0.03) 0.20** (0.04)
Retrievals 2 (x 10 -1 ) x ICSI -0.37** (0.08) -0.38** (0.08)
Density of clinics x ICSI 0.0003* (0.00)
Scale Parameter 0.2709 0.2573 0.2566
Wald x2 (d.f.) 5812 (9) 10787 (11) 11109 (12)
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors 
Number of observations: 3207; Number of clinics: 498. 
* significant at .05, ** significant at .01.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Prior research finds that specialist organizations are at a competitive disadvantage 
relative to the broader market, and that their success is predicated on their ability to both 
maintain an oppositional identity, and avoid direct competition with generalist 
organizations. However, beyond these assumptions, relatively little is known about the 
unique competitive dynamics of specialist, craft based organizations. I find, however, a 
rich set of empirical contexts which seeks to shed light on this space in the market, and 
show (a) that these types of organizations are becoming increasingly competitive in the 
broader market, and (b) the success, growth, and survival of these organizations are often 
determined by firm-specific characteristics and competitive dynamics within these 
industries, rather than generalist strategies which drive collateral damage in specialist 
markets.
As a result, I argue that new theories need to emerge in order to address, 
understand, and interpret these emergent markets where specialist organizations are 
beginning to thrive. Moreover, I suggest that existing theories should be updated to 
incorporate these new trends as well. This leads to a great deal of potential for future 
research within this domain across a number of different theoretical perspectives. For 
example, the vast majority of empirical contexts used to study craft based, specialist
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organizations, are traditional or artisanal in nature (for example, microbreweries, organic 
farming, and grass fed beef). Nevertheless, a great deal of potential exists related to the 
study of craft based organizations, which also leverage high levels of technology­
intensive innovation. For example, custom bicycle frame manufacturers and high-end 
mountaineering or mountain climbing equipment are examples of industries that rely on 
identity-based perceptions of quality and exclusivity. Yet, they also rely on modern 
technological innovations, and are anything but traditional. Therefore, future research 
could look into the degree to which organizational (both individual and collective) 
identities are shaped by technological change or discontinuities in the market. This 
would be particularly interesting in a context where the industry is known for high levels 
of authenticity and tradition. Additional areas for future research, which continue along 
the lines of the findings in this dissertation, include studies of how consumers respond 
when consolidation begins to occur in specialist industries, either by specialists 
consolidating with one another, or large generalists acquiring smaller specialists. This 
has already begun to occur in the craft beer industry, however, the number of these 
acquisitions are not yet sufficient for a robust empirical test of the phenomenon.
Finally, understanding how craft based identities change as new set of consumers 
interact with specialists industries also holds promise. For example, the oppositional 
identity within the craft beer market has been so successful in large part because of a core 
group of stakeholders who socially identify with the craft breweries. Yet, as these 
breweries begin to cross over more and more into the mainstream market, this identity is 
increasingly being shaped by consumers, critics and competitors that are not nearly as 
dedicated as the core set of stakeholders. Thus, unpacking how diverse cohorts of
consumers change over time, and the implications this has on organizational identity and 
performance should be a fruitful domain of study moving forward.
While my results provide several important implications for existing theory, and 
contribute to a number of different theoretical perspectives (including work on identity, 
cooperative/competitive dynamics, innovation, and resource partitioning), much more 
work is needed to better understand these industries that appear to be growing in number, 
appeal, and economic significance.
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